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 2 
Abstract 
 
Presently, China is the largest donor, trading partner, and investor on the African 
continent. The current success of Sino-African relations can be traced back to global 
South-South cooperation beginning in the 1960s and 1970s when China assisted in 
funding independence movements across the African continent. Since then, China 
established itself as a reliable friend and alternative aid provider. The country has since 
transitioned from utilizing aid to foreign direct investment. Since 2013, China has 
continued to bolster its own global economic positioning by pushing a foreign policy 
agenda (One Belt One Road) that targets developing countries by providing massive 
loans to fund urban infrastructure projects that promise development. China utilizes debt-
trap diplomacy to leverage Africa’s development of underdevelopment and resulting 
infrastructure gap to gain political and economic power by fostering economic 
dependency. Ultimately, China has used opaque foreign policy to evolve into a neo-
colonial force on the African continent.  
 
In this senior honors thesis, I analyze the contemporary relationship between 
China and Zambia. I argue that the Sino-Zambian relationship is historically rooted 
beginning in Zambia’s decolonization process, largely unequal, and demonstrates China’s 
silent but growing neo-colonial presence on the African continent. Applying an 
interdisciplinary approach, I utilize historical analysis, media studies, urban studies, 
international studies and political analysis. I engage with the theoretical framework of 
neo-colonialism to decipher the complex power imbalance that characterizes Sino-
Zambian relations. Highlighting Lusaka as my case study city, I analyze its social 
fragmentation and growing anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of local perceptions of 
Chinese hegemony. Anti-Chinese perceptions are exacerbated by local politicians and the 
media, resulting in violence against Chinese nationals in Lusaka. Employing a research 
method based in reading secondary sources, policy analysis and a content analysis of 
media sources, I assert that while China is a neo-colonial force in Lusaka, simultaneously 
Zambia’s preference in China as a primary lender is an exertion of Zambian national 
sovereignty and decision-making capabilities despite deep debt distress.    
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 4 
Introduction 
Zambia’s sovereign debt is expected to reach an appalling and distressing ninety-
six percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020.1 This news comes at 
a time when the country is already scrambling to find ways to tackle the “impending 
breakdown of its power supply, its inability to pay for electricity imports, and is staring 
down the barrel of further defaults on construction project financing and bond 
payments.”2 As of now, the government’s greatest focus is renegotiating, restructuring, 
and refinancing its debts to its primary creditor, China. Zambia spent much of the 2000s 
acquiring massive sums of Chinese debt for infrastructure development, as will be 
explored in this thesis. It was not until late 2017 that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) officially declared Zambia at high risk of debt distress.3 Since 2017, the Zambian 
government has spent a disproportionate amount of its national budget on debt servicing.4 
The Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) reports that the 
government spent ZK 9.1 billion on debt servicing in the first half of 2018 alone, which 
was nearly as much as the entirety of debt servicing in 2017 (previously a record-
breaking ZK 9.8 billion.)5 As for 2019, “debt [servicing] payments have consumed the 
largest allocation of the national budget amounting to ZK 23.6 billion or twenty-seven 
percent of the entire budget. The amount allocated to debt servicing in 2019 is equivalent 
to the total [national] allocation for health, education, and social protection [services] 
 
1 Elliot Smith. “Zambia's Spiraling Debt Offers Glimpse into the Future of Chinese Loan Financing in 
Africa.” CNBC, 14 Jan. 2020. 
2 Smith. 
3 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 
CUTS International, Jan. 2019. 4.  
4 Debt servicing refers to paying back the principal debt (the initial amount of money that is borrowed) and 
interest. 
5  “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.”  8.  
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combined.” 6 Debt servicing drains the majority of Zambia’s national revenues, at the 
cost of greatly needed social spending. The distress of Zambia’s national debt crisis is 
often discussed from a global economic perspective, concerning finding new sources of 
foreign investment. Less attention is paid to the effects of national debt distress on 
individuals. With that being said, “Zambians will be the first to pay the real price for the 
country’s debt, as…social services are underinvested, and [the] economy is weak.”7 As of 
now, new taxes are being implemented while old taxes are being raised, the Zambian 
Kwacha is weakening, imports are becoming more expensive, and the entire country is 
experiencing debt-fueled inflation. 89 
African governments like Zambia experience a great deal of international public 
scrutiny for how they have been able to secure an extraordinary amount of national debt. 
But little attention is given to understanding why African national debt continues to grow, 
or its geopolitical implications on the continent.10 Conceivably there is a lack of 
understanding about the difference between national independence and economic 
independence. By the start of China’s main wave on investment on the African continent 
in the 2000s, nearly all African countries had declared national independence, but not 
economic independence. Many were still and continue to be reliant on the economic 
assistance of Western institutions and countries, and as will be addressed in this paper, 
the East. This being the case, I contend that in African countries, establishing economic 
independence is the same process as eliminating neocolonialism.11  
 
6 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 10.  
7 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.”  6.  
8 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 11. 
9 Kwacha is Zambia’s national currency.  
10 Anzetse Were. “Debt-Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa's Development Options.” The South Africa Institute 
of International Affairs, Sept. 2018. 1.  
11 N. I. Vysotskaia and Arlo Schultz. “The Struggle of the African Peoples Against 
Neocolonialism.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 6, no. 4, 1976. 12-13.  
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More attention needs to be paid to the fact that China’s accumulation of Sub-
Saharan African debt is not a fluke but an apparatus for the Chinese neo-colonization of 
African sovereign nations. Since 2000, China has been able to accrue a little above 
fourteen percent of Sun-Saharan Africa’s total debt.12 China’s aid and investment in the 
continent is driven by its interest in improving its global trade and economic power, 
while simultaneously fostering economic dependency, eroding African economic growth 
potential, and undermining connectivity within the African Union (AU).13 Definitively, 
the Sino-African relationship is characterized by an asymmetry of power.  
In understanding the asymmetrical assertion of power between China and Zambia, 
it is imperative to be familiar with the discourse that surrounds the subject. Foreign 
policy is the consolidation of strategies implemented by a government to protect its 
national interests in its interactions and dealings with other countries. Foreign policy is 
often used to promote and protect national interests in foreign direct investment (FDI). 
FDI is a business investment made into a country, by either a firm or another individual 
country, after establishing foreign assets and business operations within the country 
receiving investment. The term International Financial Institution (IFI), typically refers 
to organizations founded through the collaboration of multiple countries, with the 
intention of advocating for public and private FDI, to promote social and economic 
development in developing countries. In the context of this argument, the IFI’s most 
discussed are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These IFI’s 
tend to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which are a series of policies 
 
12 Were, 4.  
13 Ernest Toochi Aniche, “Neo-Dependency? A Critical Analysis of Implications of Sino-African Economic 
Relations for African Integration and Development.” Research Gate, Nov. 2015. 24. 
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that debt-stricken countries must follow to receive loans and funding for servicing on 
older debts. These policies typically emphasize privatization, neo-liberalization, currency 
devaluation, and a reduction of government spending on social services.14 Debt 
sustainability is an analysis of a nation-state’s current debt and borrowing practices to 
determine that country’s long-term capacity to follow through with its debt servicing 
obligations.15 A national debt crisis occurs when a country borrows large sums of money 
at a faster rate than its economy is growing, thus the government is unable to service 
(read pay back) its national debt owed to lenders, which can be another county or 
international institutions. The phrase, debt-trap diplomacy was created as a phrase to 
critique the Chinese government’s predatory foreign policy scheme of excessively 
lending to already deeply indebted countries with the intention of repossessing national 
assets and raw materials once the indebted country becomes unable to service its debts. 
These debt-trap diplomacy loans typically fund urban infrastructure projects, which are 
the essential physical structures and facilities necessary for a smoothly running society; 
such as buildings, roads, bridges, power supplies, telecommunications, tunnels, railways, 
electrical grids, airports, public space, and more. The Patriotic Front (PF) is the ruling 
political in Zambia, which was formed by Michael Sata as “a grassroots movement of 
revolutionary peasants, workers and intellectuals” with the goal of sustainable and wide-
spread development for all, by condemning rapacious international investment. 16  
Perhaps most important is understanding the term neo-colonialism, which is the 
economic and political control over another country, particularly a formerly colonized 
 
14 Welch, Carol. “Structural Adjustment Programs & Poverty Reduction Strategy.” Institute for Policy 
Studies, 12 Oct. 2005. 
15 “Modernizing the Framework for Fiscal Policy and Public Debt Sustainability Analysis.” International 
Monetary Fund, 5 Aug. 2011. 6.  
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(and still developing) country. At the core of neo-colonialism is economic dependency. A 
neo-colonial power can be either the original colonizing country or an entirely new 
country with more economic power, as is the case with China in Zambia. I deploy the 
notion of neo-colonialism as developed by Kwame Nkrumah, and further explore its 
ramifications in each chapter.      
Today, China is considered a prosperous upper-middle-income developing 
country.17 This has not always been the case. Beginning in the 1970s China underwent 
intense economic reform through FDI and interior socioeconomic restoration. This 
allowed for “China’s rapid economic growth exceed[ing] the pace of institutional 
development” and ultimately lifting nearly 850 million people out of poverty.18 Whereas 
presently China is a major provider of development loans, nearly fifty years ago when it 
was an oil-exporting country, China “had its own experience as a borrower of these kinds 
of credit…in the 1970s, when it received a number of oil-backed loans from Japan”.19 20 
By the end of 1999, Japan had provided China with US $1.02 billion in development 
loans, which were mainly used to build urban infrastructure in China’s coastal regions.21 
China’s indebtedness to Japan did not foster economic dependence because while 
accepting Japanese loans, in the late 1970s China simultaneously underwent “its own 
program of socioeconomic transformation and reform, Gai Ge Kai Fang, meaning 
‘change the system, open the door.’” This reform resulted in the privatization of 
 
16 Chanda, Sunday Chilufya. “Zambia: Why the Patriotic Front Continues to Be Zambia's Number One Party 
of Choice.” The Lusaka Times, 3 Aug. 2019.  
17 “The World Bank in China.” The World Bank, 13 Dec. 2019. 
18 “The World Bank in China.” 
19 China began exporting crude oil to Japan in 1973. This ended in 1993 when China’s demand for crude oil 
surpassed its own domestic production rate. Since then China has relied on imported oil.  
20 Ana Alves. “China's Economic Statecraft in Africa: Continuity and Change.” Harvard Asia Quarterly, 
2014. 8.  
21 Masayuki Masuda. “Japan’s Changing ODA Policy Towards China.” China Perspectives, June 2003. 1.  
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considerable portions of the Chinese economy and the liberalization of investment and 
trade, not much different than the IMF implemented SAPs in Africa in the 1990s.22  
Undoubtedly China mirrored its own FDI to Africa after its Japanese development 
loans; nevertheless, the impact that development loans had on China is starkly different 
from the current impact of development loans in Africa. This vastly different economic 
impact is due to the fact that Chinese development loans in Africa are “taking place in 
some of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world [with] the greatest need for 
investment [and] the greatest economic and social vulnerability.” 23 China’s self-imposed 
Gai Ge Kai Fang reform was exactly that, self-imposed. Contrarily, when Africa 
underwent similar economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s (in conjunction with 
development loans) to foster development, it was imposed by the exterior force of the 
IMF, a West-dominated institution with a history of fostering the development of 
underdevelopment in formerly colonized, thus economically vulnerable, countries. 
China’s economic reform policies did not include the most detrimental conditions that the 
IMF imposed on African economic reform, which are a reduction in government 
spending on social services and currency devaluation, which both cultivated extreme 
poverty before China’s massive wave of investment beginning in the 2000s.24 Evidently, 
when China received Japanese development loans, the country was in a much better 
economic circumstance than many Africa countries to begin with. Conclusively, China 
utilized its own experience with FDI in the form of development loans to model its 
foreign policy in Africa, yet with a dark, predatory, neo-colonial twist, therefore enabling 
China to economically benefit in ways that the Japanese government had not intended.          
 
22 Henning Melber. “China in Africa: A New Partner of Another Imperialist Power?” Africa Spectrum, vol. 
43, no. 3, 2008. 399.  
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The existing literature on China-in-Africa and the Sino-Zambian relationship tend 
to adhere to one of three prevailing schools of thought. One approach that scholars take is 
to perceive and promote China as a violent neo-colonial force within Africa. This 
approach is done by using antagonistic language associated with colonization and 
uncovering China’s neo-colonial practices on the continent. This existing literature tends 
to answer the question: How is China a neo-colonial force within Africa? A salient 
feature of this school of thought is to focus on the fact that China is driven by its 
economic agenda, which is bolstering its own global economic positioning. These 
scholars argue that China has no genuine interest in collaborating with the African 
continent as equal partners. Instead, China is responsible for pushing developing 
countries that are already in the global economic periphery even further out, to gain 
power and place itself at the center of the global economic order. Another salient feature 
is that scholars target China’s extraction of natural resources as an eternally colonial 
operation. These scholars utilize Africa’s history of colonization to argue that the 
elicitation of raw materials from developing countries will always be colonial, no matter 
the intentions. A scholar that follows this school of thought is Rudolf du Plessi.  
Generally, there is extensive scholarship on China as an African ally and an agent 
of development. A salient feature of this school of thought is that it promotes China as a 
better alternative of FDI than the United States, Europe, and IFIs. These scholars fixate 
on China’s offering of lower interest rates, the power of Global South cooperation, and 
China’s foreign policy anti-political intervention approach. Another salient feature of this 
school of thought is to emphasize how China’s economic engagement with Zambia (and 
 
23 Aniche, 17.  
24 William Easterly. Reinventing Foreign Aid. MIT Press, 2008. 351.  
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other African countries) has already elevated their political standing. Overall, the 
approach of China as an agent of development in Africa tends to answer the question: 
What can happen when China works with African countries? The focus is on the 
perceived gains already experienced and the positive future to come of the Sino-African 
relationship. The main theorists of this approach are Hong Yu and Ana Alves.  
Lastly, there is extensive scholarship that conceptualizes Africa’s current 
economic dependency on China as a result of the culmination of its economic history. For 
instance, these scholars centralize their arguments around contextualizing Zambia’s 
political, economic, and cultural history, to understand how Zambia’s economic 
dependency on China came to be. A key feature of this approach is to analyze Zambia as 
China’s perfect storm through its national history, going as far back as its independence, 
taking into consideration rises and drops in commodity prices, the SAPs implemented by 
the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, and Zambia’s infrastructure gap to 
explain how China was able to penetrate Zambia’s economy through a small need-based 
gap in which China’s blew open. Another key feature of this scholarly approach is to 
compare the Sino-Zambian relationship to United States-Zambian and European-
Zambian relations.  These scholars assert that Zambia has neo-colonial ties with both the 
East and West; the only difference seems to be the methods and approaches taken by the 
neo-colonial powers. With that being said, the consequences persist and manifest in the 
same manner. This school of thought tends to feel more grounded and less agenda-
pushing. The main theorists of this approach are Deborah Brautigam, Chris Alden, 
Anzetse Were, Padraig Carmody, and policy research institutions. 
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Recognizing the significance of contextualizing Zambia’s political and economic 
history to understand the Sino-Zambian relationship, the arguments of this thesis follow 
this third school of thought. Nonetheless, what sets my research apart from the literature 
currently available on the Sino-Zambian subject is my interest in the human component 
of urban infrastructure investments. In this thesis, I explore how the recent rise in 
investment has been perceived by local Lusaka residents through a media analysis, which 
I have not seen much of in other research. Overall, this thesis makes connections between 
the academic and economic research on the subject and the on-the-ground reactions of 
local actors and its political implications. 
The driving questions for this research are broken down into two categories: 
macro-level and micro-level. The main macro-level leading questions are: is Chinese 
urban infrastructure investment in Lusaka a form of neo-colonization? What are China’s 
motives in Zambia, and greater Africa? And what attracts African leaders to be 
economically engaged with China through infrastructure loans? And how is China’s 
interest in global trade and economic power influencing the urban transformation of 
Zambia? An additional macro-level driving question that I didn’t anticipate would drive 
my research was: How does the West impact the Sino-Zambian relationship? The leading 
questions on the micro-level tend to focus on the urban component of the Sino-Zambian 
relationship as it is experienced in Lusaka. These questions ask: How is China’s presence 
in Lusaka perceived by Zambians? And how are loan-driven investments altering local 
politics and civil society in Lusaka?  
The methodology for addressing my research questions is an approach based 
largely around the careful reading of secondary sources, alongside policy analysis and 
 13 
content analysis of media sources. In order to answer the macro-level driving questions, 
which focus on international affairs I inspect the political and economic engagement 
between China and African countries, particularly Zambia. These questions about the 
neo-colonial nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship (and the greater Sino-African 
relationship) are investigated by delving deep into the origins of China in Africa and 
contextualizing the evolving nature of the Sino-African relationship over time. In 
addition, I use Kwame Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, 
published in the early stages of African independence movements in 1965, to determine 
my own frame of reference for neo-colonization. In regard to analyzing the neo-colonial 
aspect of Chinese built urban infrastructure projects in Lusaka, I examine China’s foreign 
policy strategies, such as the One Belt One Road initiative, which allows China to enter 
African markets. By closely analyzing One Belt One Road I am able to uncover what 
attracts African leaders, as well as understand the motives behind China’s massive 
international investments, determining whether or not China is truly devoted to its claims 
of mutually beneficial economic engagement.   
Furthermore, I examine the infrastructure that has been built by looking at the 
impact the projects have on the local community and analyzing the discourse that local 
Lusaka residents and Zambian politicians use when discussing the Chinese funded 
projects and the repayment of loans (or more so the inability to do so). As for these 
micro-level questions which focus on local perceptions of the Sino-Zambian relationship, 
I focus on collecting information from local news source websites; primarily The Lusaka 
Times, Zambia Daily Mail, Zambian Watchdog, and Times of Zambia. By reading 
through op-eds and letters to the editors I was able to uncover local attitudes, which in the 
 14 
end reinforced my own hypothesis of China being a neo-colonial force in Zambia. As for 
the judgment and influence of local politicians to determine how loan-driven investment 
alters local politics, I looked at how the Patriotic Front’s former leader, Michael Sata, 
catapulted to national attention by highlighting the matter of China’s neo-colonial 
presence to national attention, making it a contentious political issue for the first time 
ever starting in 2006. By examining local perceptions and completing the media and 
political analysis, I am able to contextualize and expose the origins of the growing anti-
Chinese sentiment and violence within Lusaka. Finally, in the interest of investigating 
how Lusaka’s urban landscape changes because of Chinese infrastructure loans, I explore 
the displacement of informal settlements in Lusaka’s urban peripheries as a result of 
Chinese companies building gated communities for growing presence of Chinese 
migrants, thus creating more urban and social fragmentation within the capital. 
 Comprehensively, Chinese neo-colonialism in Zambia is historically rooted. 
During Zambia’s early postcolonial process in the 1960s and 1970s, China established 
itself as an African ally through south-south cooperation and aid. In the wake of the 
destructive SAPs implemented by IFIs in the 1980s and 1990s, the Sino-Zambian 
relationship evolved as China utilized the neo-colonial process of Flexigemony to 
leverage Zambia’s desire for development through urban infrastructure in order to fulfill 
its own economic agenda. By the early 2000s, China established itself as an alternative 
provider of foreign direct investment to Zambia. As a result, Zambia finds itself a victim 
of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, which has fostered deep economic dependency. Being 
that China is not the only neo-colonial force in Zambia and that economic independence 
in the near future looks bleak, Zambia’s preference in China as a primary loan provider is 
 15 
the exertion of Zambian national sovereignty and decision-making capabilities; 
ultimately attempting to make the best of its no-win economic circumstance. Whereas 
there is cohesive macro-level engagement, on the micro-level the Sino-Zambian 
relationship produces urban fragmentation; particularly through a growing xenophobic 
sentiment in Lusaka, which is heightened by the media and the Patriotic Front thus 
resulting in violence against the Chinese expatriate community in Lusaka.  
This thesis is broken down into three chapters, each tackling a different layer of 
the process and nature of neo-colonialism in the Sino-Zambian relationship. Chapter one, 
titled, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?: Contextualizing the Historical and Contemporary 
Sino-African Relationship contextualizes the historic and contemporary Sino-African 
relationship. This chapter addresses China’s motives for increased investment in Africa, 
along with uncovering the African appeal. In addition, this chapter highlights the Chinese 
government’s use of the neo-colonial method of what scholars refer to as Flexigemony to 
penetrate African markets through strategies tailored to particular African geographies 
and histories.  Particular attention is paid to the One Belt One Road initiative, which is 
China’s current aggressive foreign policy around the world. This initiative targets 
developing countries, in which China gives massive development loans to pay for urban 
infrastructure backed by either natural resources or the asset itself. Ultimately, this 
chapter conceptualizes the Sino-African relationship as unequal because of China’s debt-
traps, the exertion of Chinese soft power, and Chinas undermining of African democracy, 
in conjunction with the limited bargaining power of African governments.  
Chapter two, titled, From “Win-Win” to No-Win: Sino-Zambian Relations, 
Underdevelopment, and African Agency illuminates the Sino-Zambian relationship as 
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deeply rooted, yet very unequal. This chapter uncovers the origins of the Sino-Zambian 
relationship in the funding of independence movements and projects in the 1960s and 
1970s, following through to the disastrous effects of SAPs implemented by the IMF and 
World Bank in the 1990s, and China’s growing FDI in the 2000s. It is exposed that 
China’s current presence in Zambia has been made possible by Zambia’s complex 
economic history. In addition, chapter two officially introduces Lusaka as the case study 
city for investigating Chinese funded urban infrastructure projects. The history of 
Lusaka’s urban development highlights Zambia’s infrastructure gap, of which China 
recognizes and uses to leverage economic dependency. This chapter officially recognizes 
China as a predatory neo-colonial force in Zambia.   
Chapter three, titled, Investors of “Infesters”?: Social Fragmentation and the Rise 
of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Lusaka, diverges from the economic implications of China’s 
neo-colonization of Zambia, and focuses on the on-the-ground implications for local 
residents in Lusaka. This chapter addresses the local perception of China as a neo-
colonial force in Zambia, which has led to the growing anti-Chinese sentiment within 
Lusaka. Lusaka’s growing anti-Chinese sentiment is conceptualized as local frustrations 
with the Zambian and Chinese government that being taken out on Chinese nationals 
living in Lusaka. Additionally, this chapter takes a look at the rhetoric in op-eds and 
letters to the editor from local newspapers about the Sino-Zambian relationship. 
Furthermore, a political analysis is conducted of Michael Sata’s 2006, 2008, and 2011 
presidential campaigns, in which the Patriotic Front took a clear anti-foreign investment, 
particularly anti-Chinese platform. In the end, it is conceptualized that politics and the 
 17 
media heighten local frustrations with the Sino-Zambian relationship, resulting in violent 
protests and riots targeting Chinese nationals within the Lusaka.   
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A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Contextualizing the Historic and 
Contemporary Sino-African Relationship 
 
 As a result of political reconstruction that pushed for economic liberalization, 
China has been able to rise dramatically in the global economic order.25 Whereas China 
once found itself at the periphery, it now sits powerfully in the very center of the global 
economic system. China’s continued economic success can be attributed to its ability to 
leverage its own economic prosperity to push a foreign policy agenda that provides 
massive loans for fund urban infrastructure projects that promise to bring development. 
This agenda, called One Belt One Road, targets underdeveloped countries in which the 
government is deeply concerned with development through infrastructure, yet is not able 
to finance such. With that, Africa stands out to China as a strategic location because of its 
large infrastructure gap as a result of its history which fostered extensive 
underdevelopment, along with other factors. The current success of the Sino-African 
relationship can be traced back to global south-solidarity beginning in the decolonization 
process in Africa. China funded many decolonization movements across the continent by 
providing aid (and weapons), often when others refused, basically making China a 
longtime alternative funder to African governments. Over time the Chinese aid model has 
transitioned from giving aid to what is currently used, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
with opaque policies through the deceiving process of Flexigemony.   
 China’s current economic engagement on the African continent can be described 
as utilizing the process of Flexigemony.26 Flexigemony is a neo-colonial method in 
which the Chinese government contextualizes the particular histories, politics, and 
geographies of the African nation-states it wishes to engage with, and adapts and alters its 
 
25 Carmody Pádraig R. The New Scramble for Africa. 1st ed., Polity Press, 2011. 66. 
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approaches to correspond with its spatial context.27 The core of this strategy is 
maintaining flexibility in engagement strategy in order to cultivate the most economically 
beneficial relationships between China and individual African countries. With that being 
said, each country that China engages with, particularly through the One Belt One Road 
initiative, manages a distinct relationship with the Chinese government.  For instance, 
China administers aid and investment in the form of loans to both democratic and non-
democratic governments, which significantly alters the ways in which it engages with 
both types of political regimes. In countries in which African elites hold restrictive 
control over the country’s natural resources, China requires external factors and agents to 
develop personal relationships with the elites. Contrarily, in democratic African 
countries, China’s approach to economic engagement places strategic importance on 
adhering to the law.28 For instance, in historically politically unstable Sudan, the Chinese 
government has focused on negotiating peace treaties. On the other hand, in more stable 
Zambia, the Chinese government has focused on improving its public image within 
Lusaka (and other major urban centers) due to increased civil unrest in response to 
dissatisfaction with the rapidly growing Chinese presence.29  
 Flexigemony is a part of China’s neo-colonial intervention in Africa. The neo-
colonial method relies on China’s amicable historical relationships to justify its present 
engagement on the continent. It is China’s friendly engagement with African countries 
beginning in the 1960s, and stretching through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, that laid the 
groundwork for current Sino-African relations. Through the implementation of 
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Flexigemony it becomes clear that Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa is historically 
rooted.  
By utilizing Flexigemony, the Chinese government has been able to slowly 
emerge as one of the most significant forces in the African continent’s economy, nearly 
unnoticeable. China’s slow and seemingly silent emergence in the African economy was 
made possible by its ability to create personalized, substantive, and very private 
relationships with different heads of state, in which information is virtually sealed from 
outside actors. At the core of China’s Flexigemony strategy is its value of economic 
power over anything else. China claims to have little interest in political and military 
engagement and therefore opts to contextualize interactions to forge an economic 
relationship avoiding political conflict. This corresponds with China’s philosophy of 
heping juequi, translated as China’s “peaceful rise,” to global economic and therefore 
political dominance by maintaining positive relationships with its global economic 
partners.30 
Unfortunately, Flexigemony is indeed a deceiving process. It promotes mutual 
benefits for China and Africa through marketing tactics such as “win-win cooperation” 
when in reality it is simply a way to push Chinese initiatives into Africa that allow for 
China to exert soft power and ultimately undermine African democracy.31 With that 
being said, despite the Sino-African relationship being historically rooted, the 
relationship is very much unequal. African nation-states have limited bargaining chips, 
and yet have more to lose because of their positioning in the global economic periphery. 
And yet, despite the inequality in the Sino-African relationship, African governments 
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continue to pursue deep economic engagement and integration with China because the 
very little their get in return is better than the limited opportunities they have previously 
endured.   
The Historical Sino-African Relationship  
For the past thirty years, many African countries have endured economic 
stagnation despite being in the post-independence era, due to accruing substantial debt, 
limited gains from exports, and the implementation of damaging structural adjustment 
programs by international financial institutions. Simultaneously, China implemented a 
political reconstruction, enabling substantial economic improvement.32 China’s economic 
rise is characterized by its economy growing an average of ten percent per year for the 
last thirty years as a result of economic liberalization.33 This systematic reconstruction 
has permitted for China to rise from a developing country to the second-largest economy 
in the world, trailing close behind the United States.  Recognizing the African continent’s 
struggles with the “paradox of plenty” - that is, being resource-rich, and yet economically 
poor - China has historically perceived itself as being in a position to help boost the 
African continent’s economy through aid.34 As foreign aid is an instrument of foreign 
policy, China’s aid to African leaders is shaped by policies it established in the 1950s, at 
the beginning of the Cold War. Beijing opted to pledge non-interference in the governing 
of African nations and used aid to leverage support in competing against the Soviet 
Union and the United States.35 From the 1960s to the 1980s, China’s foreign aid to Africa 
became intermittent, and at the same time underwent a major evolution. Nonetheless, 
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there is little known about China’s foreign aid practices. Despite becoming increasingly 
transparent about its foreign aid policy, very little information has been released in terms 
of the official figures, such as how much aid is given, and to which particular regions.  
Out of the little that is known, it has been established that China has a long history of 
giving vast amounts of foreign aid to mainly  Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, Egypt, 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe, among a few others.36 With that being said, it is known that 
China’s foreign aid in Africa has historically supported a multitude of African industries, 
such as the health, communications, agriculture, education, and infrastructure sectors.  
In the 1960s, Sino-African foreign aid was quite intense; China helped fund 
independence movements across the continent. This aid model remained strong 
throughout the 1970s, in which China spent close to seven percent of its gross domestic 
product on aid assistance in Africa during the Chinese cultural revolution, despite a brief 
episode of economic difficulty.37 In the early 1970s, despite being relatively poor, China 
loaned over US $400 million to Zambia to build the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway.38 
Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964. However, it remained vulnerable to 
white minority regimes due to its endorsement of black liberation movements in nearby 
areas.39 This caused economic destabilization because Zambia remained dependent on 
trade routes that passed through neighboring regions occupied by colonial forces. In an 
attempt to secure sovereignty, Zambian officials requested financial assistance from 
international financial institutions to build new trade routes, but to no avail. When 
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traditional donors turned Zambian officials down, China recognized this as a chance to 
bolster Sino-African relations and volunteered to help construct and finance a 2,000 
kilometer-long heavy railway line from the Zambia Copperbelt through Tanzania to the 
seaport at Dar es Salaam.40 Packaged as a form of foreign aid, the Tazara railway was 
financed by a zero-interest loan for RMB ¥980 million (roughly US $140 million).41 This 
foreign aid infrastructure project was successfully able to stabilize both Zambia’s 
national sovereignty and economy. To this day, it remains the most iconic example of 
positive Sino-African relations and the success of China’s foreign aid on the African 
continent. Unbeknownst to many, the construction of the Tazara railway kickstarted the 
evolution of Chinese foreign aid to take the form of concessional loans for infrastructure 
projects.  
By the end of the 1980s, China’s foreign aid to Africa drastically slowed. This did 
not harm Sino-African relations because of the copious amounts of aid that were 
previously given. By then, China had gained the diplomatic recognition and respect of 
forty-four African nations, except Swaziland, which has vowed to maintain its allegiance 
with Taiwan.42 In 1984, nearly ten years after the construction of the Tazara railway, 
Chinese leaders established an official transition of the Chinese foreign aid model, 
directly linking aid to investment in the form of concessional loans.43 This new official 
form of foreign aid was incredibly appealing to African leaders that were interested in 
economically advancing their country’s through development. Chinese foreign aid 
programs accentuated the importance of infrastructure as a necessary tool of 
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development, “at a time when the traditional donors downplayed” it.44 Unlike other 
foreign aid suppliers, Beijing identified a lack of infrastructure as a tremendous hindrance 
in development, and therefore prioritized foreign aid in the infrastructure sector, while 
also expanding and diversifying its aid model by combining pure aid with investment 
projects.45  The prioritization of urban infrastructure lending continued and then 
strengthened in 2000, when China implemented the “Going Global Strategy,” to 
encourage even more outward FDI through the construction of infrastructure projects.46 
This was a global venture that intended to take advantage of the booming globalized 
economy by financing (and constructing) of infrastructure projects at reduced production 
costs.   
The Contemporary Sino-African Relationship  
 
 Due to its global embeddedness in development, China is often portrayed as 
“ruthlessly developmental.”47 This reputation has gained more notoriety with the 
implementation of the One Belt One Road initiative, which is essentially an expansion of 
Beijing’s Going Global Strategy. The One Belt One Road is China’s most aggressive 
foreign policy and economic initiative. The initiative was created by President Xi 
Jinping’s new administration upon taking office in 2013. It is an expansive global trade 
initiative that is designed to encourage outward Chinese investment through the 
construction of infrastructure, investment, and trade between China and its neighbors in 
designated regions.48 With the One Belt One Road initiative, the Jinping administration 
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has created an alternative global development strategy in which China invest in global 
infrastructure development (most commonly in less developed countries than itself) 
through massive loans, and creates an abundance of economic interdependencies with 
China as the central node of global connectivity.   
 One Belt One Road arose from an understanding that China’s nearby countries 
have a strategic value in strengthening economic cooperation to catapult China into a 
global economic powerhouse. Nonetheless, the initiative’s roots are in its historic Silk 
Road and maritime routes that were discontinued in the 1600s. Essentially, Beijing has 
reawakened its former trade, cultural exchange, and communication routes that once 
connected Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In One Belt One Road, “One Belt” 
refers to six central land routes of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” that connects interior 
China to Central Asia and Europe, mainly through railways. The “One Road” refers to 
the “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road” which relies on three main ocean routes 
that connect China with Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa at strategic seaports.49 In a 
very short amount of time, the One Belt One Road initiative has fostered global economic 
dominance for China because of its central role and main trade beneficiary. The initiative 
stretches to nearly seventy countries across three continents, incorporating nearly sixty 
percent of the world’s population and accounting for approximately thirty percent of the 
global GDP.50 
The One Belt One Road initiative’s main objective is to limit trade barriers to 
increase connectivity. In the age of globalization, connectivity is a direct line to economic 
prosperity. In that regard, China recognizes poor infrastructure as a major obstacle to 
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economic development because of its ability to impede living standards, local 
industrialization, and foreign investment.51 To further integrate into the global economy 
through trade and investment, China has placed improving inadequate infrastructure in 
developing countries at the center of the One Belt One Road initiative. This infrastructure 
development is focused on the energy and power, public utilities, and transportation 
sectors.52 Around the globe, Beijing is implementing approximately 1,700 infrastructure 
projects, worth a total of US $900 billion.53 By all means, One Belt One Road is the 
largest development plan in contemporary history.54 On the other hand, the initiative has 
very troubling implications for debt-sustainability in developing countries. Around two-
thirds of countries participating in One Belt One Road have national credit ratings below 
investable grade.55 Chinese lending to countries with poor credit is largely controversial 
as it seems that China is more interested in acquiring assets, rather than debt repayment.  
The One Belt One Road initiative is an official framework for China’s increased 
investment in Africa, particularly through infrastructure investments. Sino-African 
connectivity is fostered through the Maritime Silk Road, linking China to nearly twenty 
African countries. China’s reach extends through East Africa to Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Kenya, up to North Africa reaching Egypt and Morocco, inland to Central Africa 
including the Democratic Republic of Congo, and finally down into Southern Africa, 
reaching Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa, to name a few countries.56  Overall, 
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China’s presence in Africa has ballooned since the implementation of One Belt One 
Road. Whereas previously Chinese investment came directly from the government, One 
Belt One Road has allowed for the diversification of Chinese FDI to Africa. Currently, 
investment (read infrastructure loans) comes from Chinese private and state-owned 
companies, commercial and policy banks, and individuals.57 The transition to Chinese 
banks has increased connectivity and strengthened the Sino-African relationship.   
 The One Belt One Road initiative extends through three continents, incorporating 
nearly sixty-five countries. Africa holds a strategic value to China, which drives its 
presence of the continent. According to geographer Padraig Carmody, there have been 
several main objectives in China’s intensified economic connectivity with the African 
continent. These ambitions range from the creation of an expanded market for Chinese 
services and manufactured goods, to provide an alternative to the global Western aid 
development model, to procure land for agriculture as it becomes scarcer in China, and to 
provide new channels of migration to Chinese citizens.58 Nonetheless, the principle 
motives behind China’s increased economic connectivity in Africa have historically been 
to increase diplomatic support from African countries to gain global dominance through 
allyship and to secure new sources of natural resources.  
 A crucial dimension of the Sino-African relationship is China’s use of African 
diplomatic support for block voting. This can be seen when China attempted to 
diplomatically isolate Taiwan. The fight for diplomatic recognition between China and 
Taiwan has “been a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since the declaration of the 
People’s Republic of China…and has guided China’s Africa policy” since revolution first 
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broke throughout the African continent.59 Beijing recognized its political strength as a 
long-time supporter of anti-colonial movements across the continent and leveraged it in 
return for getting African leaders to vote to remove Taiwan from its seat in the United 
Nations Security Council.60 Whereas Taipei attempted to fight back against China by 
conducting what is referred to as “dollar diplomacy,” by making small investments in 
Africa to preserve diplomatic support, its investments were greatly overshadowed by 
Beijing’s expansive investment power on the African continent.61  For the most part, 
Taipei held on to international support until 1997, when China increased aid investments 
across the continent, and support for Taipei slowly diminished. 62 Any remaining support 
that Taiwan had from African countries slowly diminished as China began further 
leveraging in economic power by pulling funding for infrastructure projects from 
countries that continued to support Taiwan.63 The most prominent example is in the case 
of Malawi. From 1966 to 2007 Malawi and Taiwan had strong diplomatic relations. This 
came to a halt in 2008 when China offered Malawi billions in exchange for severing ties 
with Taiwan and build an economic and diplomatic relationship with China.64 China 
strategically offering money in exchange for severed political ties is an early example of 
China exerting its soft power by leveraging Africa’s infrastructure gap and desire for 
development opportunities as a tool of Beijing’s global political agenda.   
Furthermore, it was African support that pushed for Beijing to host the 2008 
summer Olympics and African support that successfully blocked resolutions at the United 
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Nations Commission of Human Rights condemning Chinese human rights abuses.65 
African block voting has been of such value to China that Chairman Mao Zedong, the 
was frequently quoted saying, “’it is our African brothers who carried us into the United 
Nations.’” 66 67 More contemporarily, Africa plays a critical role as an “ideological 
battleground” for China to economically surpass the United States without military 
confrontation.68 Peacefully surpassing the United States as having the world’s largest 
economy is a major pillar for China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Comprehensively, by 
building a strong relationship through the financing of urban infrastructure projects, 
China essentially buys loyalty and global diplomatic support from African governments.  
The other crucial dimension of the Sino-African relationship is Africa’s strategic 
location as a resource-rich continent. Africa as resource-rich is particularly attractive for 
Chinese officials that have an excess of infrastructure development capabilities and a 
need for new sources of natural resources for its colossal population. Since 1948, China 
has chosen to rely on a model of self-sufficiency. However, with its accelerated 
population growth, the country is no longer able to sustain itself on its own supply of raw 
materials.69 In response, China has resorted to collecting raw materials from the African 
continent. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China is pursuing not only 
easy access to Africa’s raw materials, but also the ability to control their management and 
distribution. The council claims that China may be ensuring its access to natural 
resources as they become scarcer.70 A raw material that motivates China’s presence in 
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Africa is oil. It has been reported that Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, 
Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria account for roughly ninety percent of China’s oil imports 
from Africa.71 Additionally, South Africa supplies iron, and Zimbabwe also supplies iron, 
along with steel. The Democratic Republic of Congo also supplies China with copper, but 
Zambia remains China’s largest copper supplier. China’s seemingly insatiable desire for 
natural resources is used for urban development and manufacturing.72   
Following the Japanese model of resource-backed loans that was utilized in China 
in the 1970s, China provides low-interest concessional loans to resource-rich African 
countries, in which loans are backed by the natural resources available in that particular 
African country.73 Chinese leaders have traded African raw materials for an abundance of 
infrastructure projects financed by China. These projects range from sports stadiums, 
presidential palaces, housing developments, roads, railways, parliament buildings, and 
special economic trading zones. Trading natural resources for infrastructure is 
deliberately used for countries that do not have the cash-power to pay back their 
concessional loans. Between 2005 and 2012 Beijing’s investment in resource-rich 
countries nearly doubled, while its investment in non-resource-rich countries grew by a 
factor of seven.74 This implies that whereas securing natural resources is a strategic value 
of Sino-African relations, it is not the core basis of the relationship. Rather infrastructure 
investment capability drives Sino-African cooperation.  
 China has also taken a particular interest in Africa because of its growing middle 
class, urbanization, the idle infrastructure development market, and desire for 
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development as well as a more competitive position in the global economy. China’s 
recent presence in Africa has completely reworked the continent’s position in the global 
economy. Since the early 2000s, the Sino-African relationship has strengthened beyond 
expectations. This relationship is characterized by China’s ability to help foster rapid 
economic growth. Currently, China is Africa’s largest capital donor, trading partner, and 
investor.75 As of the latest available figures in 2017, China invested over US $72 million 
in the African continent, “more than twice the dollar amount of France or the U.S,” which 
are Africa’s second and third largest donors.76 China being the African continent’s largest 
donor has fostered the development of two distinct perceptions of China in Africa.  
The first perception is China as a development partner and investor. Many 
identify China’s current involvement in Africa as a strategic long-term commitment to 
the continent driven by a mutually beneficial pledge to economic interconnectivity. From 
2000 to 2010 China’s trade with Africa increased 700 percent; two-way trade ballooned 
from US $10.6 billion in 2000 to a whopping US $166 billion in 2011.77 78 Foreign aid 
figures follow a very similar path. In 2001, China’s foreign aid was US $1.8 billion to a 
massive US $20 billion more recently. The main beneficiaries of this foreign aid are in 
Africa.79 As for commercial investment, estimates say that there are at least 
approximately ten thousand Chinese businesses operating within forty-nine African 
countries.80 With that, China has transitioned from investment to economic integration 
with the African continent. The second perception is China as a colonizer. This 
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perception will be further explored in chapter two, where China’s infrastructure 
investment in Africa is analyzed through the lens of economic dependency as a form of 
neo-colonialism.  
Africa finds itself in the difficult position of being the least urbanized, yet most 
rapidly urbanizing region in the globe. Deborah Brautigam, an American political 
scientist specializing in Chinese projects in Africa, describes the continent’s 
infrastructure gap by saying, “if you could travel by satellite directly across the African 
continent on a clear night, the vastness of African underdevelopment would hit you with 
stunning effect.”81 82 This view corresponds with the World Bank’s assessment that over 
the next ten years the African continent requires up to US $170 billion in investment per 
year to achieve its infrastructure needs.83 As previously exposed, China has utilized 
Africa’s infrastructure gap as way to economically engage with the continent. The 
infrastructure projects China tends to focus on are building roads, railways, electricity 
and major construction projects, aimed to improve the physical infrastructure of cities. In 
exchange for funding Africa’s infrastructure projects, China requires the construction of 
the projects to be completed by Chinese construction companies, many of which are 
state-owned, or local construction firms that are joint ventures with Chinese construction 
companies.84 This stipulation creates big business for Chinese companies through 
employment and the gaining of a foothold in the local markets. However, there are many 
reports of complaints that Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects are of low-quality.  
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 Historically, China’s financing of urban infrastructure projects in Africa has come 
from a variety of financial institutions and funds established by the Chinese government. 
Despite the People’s Republic of China being founded in 1948, it was only in 1984 that 
the Chinese government established the People’s Bank of China as the country’s central 
bank. In this new role, the bank was mainly held responsible for implementing monetary 
policy, regulating all of mainland China’s financial institutions, and foreign exchange.85 
Strategically, the first People’s Bank of China in Africa was founded in Zambia in 1997, 
at the very start of efforts to more deeply economically integrate the two nation-states.86 
In 1994, closely following the establishment of The People’s Bank of China, The China 
Export-Import Bank, more popularly known as The Chinese Exim Bank, was founded, 
along with the China Development Bank.87 These banks continue to play a fundamental 
part in Beijing’s outreach to the African government. The Chinese Exim Bank and the 
China Development Bank are government owned institutions that promote government 
interest by maintaining the expansion of Chinese businesses in Africa by providing non-
concessional international loans and credit for construction and investment 
opportunities.88  
The Chinese Exim Bank is most known for its flexible lending and risk averse 
policies, discounted rates, long-repayment periods and interest payment “holidays,” 
which particularly appeal to African leaders.89 On the other hand, the China Development 
Bank has become a more popular choice for Chinese companies to finance urban 
infrastructure projects in Africa because of its visible prominence on the continent. 
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Before establishing its government-backed private equity fund, the China-Africa 
Development Fund in 2007, the China Development Bank had already set up temporary 
offices in African capitals to build governmental relationships on the continent. At that 
time, they explored investment project opportunities mainly in urban infrastructure, but 
also in agriculture, manufacturing, telecommunications, and resource extraction 
industries.90  
 The China-Africa Development Fund was founded on US $3 billion, with the 
intention to invest between US $5 and $50 million for each urban infrastructure project. 
The objective of the fund was to partner with European nation-states that maintain close 
ties with their former colonies to finance urban development projects. A spokesperson of 
the fund declared that European countries “may have developed a plan to invest in 
infrastructure [in former colonies in Africa], but they haven’t raised the money. We can 
use these plans. We would like to join their efforts. We would like to have joint 
projects.’” 91 Unfortunately, these plans never materialized due to economic competition 
between China and Europe. Instead, the China-Africa Development Fund opted to get 
into the business of helping Chinese companies invest in long-term ventures with high 
returns in Africa’s urban centers.92  
 Comprehensively, the People’s Bank of China, the Chinese Exim Bank, and the 
China-Africa Development Fund (through the funding of The China Development Bank), 
favor lending for infrastructure projects that are backed by Africa’s natural resources.93 
Between 2009 and 2012, Chinese financial institutions financed nearly US $10 billion to 
African governments in the form of concessional loans. In March of 2013, while on his 
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first tour of Africa, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese government 
would double China’s commitment to urban infrastructure development in Africa, 
ultimately promising that its financial institutions would loan African governments US 
$20 billion between 2013 and 2015.94 Shortly after, following through with President Xi 
Jinping’s commitment to economic engagement in Africa, more loans were promised to 
African governments. In November of 2013, the head sovereign risk analyst of the 
Chinese Exim Bank assured that by 2025, China will provide African governments with 
US $1 trillion in urban infrastructure financing through direct investment, soft loans, 
concessional loans, and commercial loans.95  These promised loans would be funded as a 
part of China’s new One Belt One Road Initiative, ultimately guaranteeing further 
economic integration between China and the African continent. The multi-billion-dollar 
low-interest loans funded through the One Belt One Road initiative are also backed by 
the resources available in the particular African countries they are given to, most 
popularly oil or minerals. Most frequently, these loans are usually given to African 
nation-states with awfully low credit ratings, which impedes their ability to access loan 
funding from the international financial market.96  China’s ability to give poor credit 
countries access to low-interest loans continues to appeal to African leaders, incentivizing 
them to completely overlook and ignore China’s lack of transparency and hidden 
conditions in loan funding.   
 Despite asserting that its foreign policy approach is based in noninterference, over 
time, Beijing has developed the ability to push its own political agendas on the African 
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countries it supports through foreign aid investment, particularly infrastructure 
investment. This strategy is the exertion of Beijing’s soft power, in which it can influence 
the decision-making and behavior of its African partners, without military force.97  
Beijing’s soft (and sometimes hard) power approach is characterized by pulling funding 
for infrastructure projects and emphasizing to African leaders the massive investments 
that Beijing has made in their urban centers in the past and present. By utilizing 
infrastructure (read development), as a pressure point, Beijing is able to instill fear in 
African leaders to cooperate with Beijing’s global agendas. This soft power strategy has 
been implemented since 1978.98 By employing infrastructure projects as statecraft 
Beijing is able to continue to assert that the political and economic rise of China will “not 
come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor 
pose a threat to any other country,” because of its use of desperation as a bargaining 
chip.99 Nonetheless, this desperation is packaged as the power of choice. In its barest 
essence, the African leaders are making the choice. However, this does not take into 
consideration the nuance of choice. Despite maintaining its peaceful nature, when taking 
into account that African leaders are being forced to choose development through 
infrastructure over making sovereign decisions, the uneven nature of Sino-African 
partnerships is exposed. By exerting its soft power, it is clear that Beijing is much more 
powerful than its African counterparts and is by no means afraid to use its power. It has 
become clear that Beijing’s “own impressive development trajectory has provided it with 
the credibility to challenge the development paths, rules, and norms advocated by the 
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multilateral institutions shaping the global order.”100 For instance, the Chinese Exim 
Bank is currently Africa’s largest supplier of infrastructure loans, an advantage that 
China is able to hold over African leaders. However, African leaders have limited 
pressure points of equal value to hold over China. The scant bargaining power that 
African leaders do have, such as control over raw materials, is delegitimized by China’s 
ability to get resources from elsewhere. For instance, despite being China’s largest 
supplier of copper, the Zambian government has limited bargaining power over its 
copper. If the Zambian government ever tried to use its copper exports to China as 
leverage, the Chinese government could easily pull investment and replace Zambian 
copper exports with copper from its second-largest supplier, Chile (followed by Peru).101 
102 It becomes clear that by non-interference Beijing was referring specifically to Western 
techniques of establishing power, like the military and conflict. On the other hand, China 
leverages development to exert soft power which undermines African democracy by 
forcing certain outcomes that African leaders have either previously rejected or expressed 
little interest. Despite the difference in approach, China and the West equally undermine 
African democracy. The idea that China is better for Africa than the West stems from 
Beijing’s marketing playing on African apprehension of Western intervention due to their 
colonial history. By positioning itself as a more reliable and less aggressive economic 
partner Beijing is able to remain, for lack of a better term, a wolf in sheep’s clothing 
within Africa.  
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China’s core philosophy of avoiding political conflict by focusing exclusively on 
mutually beneficial economic engagement is packaged as “win-win cooperation.”103 
China’s policy of non-interference is guided by four main principles, also described as 
the “’four no’s’: no hegemony, no power politics, no military alliances, and no arms 
racing.”104 By focusing only on economic cooperation, China’s approach could not be 
more different than the dominant Western aid programs implemented in Africa, which 
strongly rely on interventionism to create power politics for Western countries, and in 
fact, do very little for the development of African countries. Shortly after the 
announcement of the expansion of China’s economic connectivity through the One Belt 
One Road initiative, it was reported that at the heart of the initiative was the desire to 
come together to achieve “’The Chinese Dream’ and ‘The African Dream,’ through 
“sincerity, equality and mutual benefit; solidarity and common development.”105106 
Internationally China’s non-interference approach has been criticized as a blatant 
disregard for human rights for their refusal to intervene in the affairs of African states. 
However, many times before, representatives of the One Belt One Road initiative have 
spoken out to clarify that nonintervention policy is based on their rejection of externally 
imposed solutions.107 By basing the initiative in non-interference the Chinese government 
was able to successfully entice African leaders by validating the autonomy of African 
states to govern as they chose while also increasing development. And yet, despite claims 
of being mutually beneficial, China’s relationship with African countries is still perceived 
 
103 Bräutigam, 1.  
104 Carmody, 73.  
105 X. Chen and Myers, 92.  
106 Alden, 15.  
107 Africa Research Institute, 4.  
 39 
as uneven by many international forces because of the creation of an enormous foothold 
on the African continent.     
 Despite having surmounted its own development challenges to achieve economic 
prosperity, Chinese officials conceptualize the country as still developing, and therefore a 
leader of the Global South.108 Beijing’s foreign policy, particularly the One Belt One 
Road initiative, is China “leveraging uneven development, using Africa and other global 
peripheries, as raw material springboards…This ascent is cloaked in the rhetoric 
of….’South-South’ cooperation.”109  South-South cooperation, also known as ‘Bandung 
Spirit,” first emerged as powerful rhetoric in 2000, at the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation.110 Since then, China has utilized its position as a member of the global 
south, having also been previously exploited by colonial powers, and as historically 
supporting anti-colonial movements in Africa to strategically align itself with African 
leaders that fiercely want to replace colonial-era infrastructure that is not only outdated 
but also a constant reminder of a dark history.  
There are many motivations for African leaders to economically engage more 
deeply with China. Since its outset, the South solidarity sentiment, which can also be 
described as China as an alternative funder, has been a major motivation factor for 
African leaders to increase economic connectivity through infrastructure development. 
African leaders tend to have a deep distaste for the Western aid model that seemingly 
cannot depart from its colonial tendencies in implementing foreign policy, particularly 
foreign aid. In having a common experience as other less developed nations, China 
asserts that the Western powers are “out of touch with the needs of contemporary 
 
108 Alden, 9-10.  
109 Carmody and Taylor, 17.  
 40 
Africa.”111 Many African leaders believe that the Chinese model of development is better 
suited for their own countries because of their shared historical experiences. This belief is 
strengthened by the fact that China refuses to propose its own model of development, and 
instead prefers to support African leaders in determining their own development paths, 
with the help of Chinese funding through loans. Despite China not choosing a 
development model for its African counterparts, many African leaders would like to 
replicate China’s development model due to its rapid success (as defined by development 
and a large and continuously growing economy). These governments recognize that the 
gap between the developed and the underdeveloped only grows, and therefore would like 
to follow in China’s footsteps of building wealth through infrastructure development. 
Furthermore, a motivation for African governments is that economic integration with 
China provides them with political recognition and legitimacy. African players recognize 
China’s use of Africa as a strategic location and recognize the strength African block 
voting has in global diplomacy. Overall, the main reason for African cooperation in the 
Sino-African relationship is because of the ability to utilize aid, investment, and trade to 
further develop beyond the possibility of what their own funding can provide.   
China has utilized its own economic success to further upgrade its global 
economic positioning by pushing foreign policy agendas that promise development. 
China pursues colossal debt from underdeveloped African countries in return for toying 
with their desperation for development through infrastructure, to accommodate Africa’s 
exploding urban population. This pursuit, on China’s account, is deeply problematic 
because the Sino-African relationship is marketed as a partnership when in reality it is 
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anything but that. Despite being historically rooted in the empowerment of African 
nations, contemporarily the Sino-African relationship is top-down and blatantly unequal. 
African governments are giving up their raw materials and decision-making capabilities 
in return for infrastructure that they are unable to pay back sustainably and that will most 
likely be repossessed by China. In the end, Africa gains very little and China exceedingly 
benefits through the accumulation of raw materials, state-assets, block voting benefits, 
more economic legitimacy, and more geopolitical control over the region. Ultimately, 
claims of Sino-African relations being “win-win” is outright misinformation. The 
unequal nature of Sino-African relations can be most easily observed in the Sino-
Zambian relationship. To look more deeply at the integrity of the Sino-Zambian 
relationship, this thesis will utilize China’s presence in Lusaka as a case study. 
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“Win-Win” to No-Win: Sino-Zambian Relations, Underdevelopment, 
and African Agency  
 
 Zambia is considered a Southern African country due to its extensive social and 
economic connectivity with other countries in the Southern African region. As one of the 
most urbanized countries in Africa, it has an urbanization rate of over fifty percent.112 
Zambia’s major urban center, Lusaka, was first developed when the territory was taken 
from the original indigenous people, the majority of which were the Soli and Lenje 
people, and colonized by the British South African Company in the 1890s.113 114 Under 
British colonial rule Zambia was called Northern Rhodesia; initially, the territory did not 
have any major urban centers, but this is not to say that Zambia’s urban history begins 
with its European colonization.115 Lusaka was officially declared a city in 1913, but 
records show that settlers had already established their presence in towns further north in 
Zambia’s Copperbelt at least a decade before.116117 Many of Zambia’s other major cities 
developed in the 1930s as a result of the growing copper mining industry that began in 
the 1920s.118 119  
Lusaka was named by the British after the previous Chief Lusaka of the Soli 
people. In 1905, Lusaka was established as a five kilometer long and 1.5-kilometer wide 
railway siding for a railway line that was primarily used to ship copper from the Katanga 
Province (in present-day the Democratic Republic of Congo) to ports in South Africa.120 
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However, noticing Lusaka’s potential as a new and strategic point in Southern Africa, the 
city grew because it appealed to white farmer settlers mostly from South Africa. As the 
city grew, the British South African Company attained a charter from the British 
government to grant white settlers in Lusaka that right to maintain and govern their local 
affairs.121 Lusaka continued to grow and expand and in 1931 it was established as the 
capital of Northern Rhodesia because of its strategic location on the main north-to-south 
African railway line, which was expected to become a critical urban development hub. 
Additionally, Lusaka was the most domestically interconnected urban center in Zambia, 
was within close reach of the Copperbelt, and contained significant underground water 
resources located within limestone/dolomite aquifers. Initial plans for Lusaka conceived 
it as Northern Rhodesia’s administration center, which resulted in the city as a mostly 
white space with limited possibility of alternative economic activity besides government 
administration.122 It was not until after 1948 that Lusaka’s black population swelled due 
to an ordinance that granted black African families the right to live in the city. Previously 
black African men were permitted only temporary urban residence permits dependent 
upon their employment contracts; their wives and children were not allowed to the right 
to reside in Lusaka with them.123 Despite Zambia gaining its independence in 1964, 
Lusaka maintained its position as the country’s economic and governmental hub as it 
transitioned into a majority black space. 
 Contemporarily Lusaka remains Zambia’s most crucial economic, governmental, 
and commercial hub. Despite being a rather small city in comparison to the populations 
of other African capitals, Lusaka is one of the fastest developing cities in Southern 
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Africa. Today, Zambia finds itself in a rather difficult economic position due to the 
decline and stagnation of its copper mining industry in the 1970s and 1980s which has 
resulted in dramatically decreased economic production and growing national debt.124 
Since then, Lusaka has battled increasing rates of urban poverty despite being one of the 
least impoverished urban centers in Zambia. The bulk of Lusaka’s urban poor resides in 
large informal peri-urban settlements with limited public services.125 These populations 
tend to go unaccounted for, which is reflected in Lusaka’s reported population; whereas it 
is officially reported that the city has a population of roughly 1.7 million, many sources 
estimate the population is closer to over two million, with the uncounted population 
living in the unauthorized peri-urban slums.126 Lusaka’s current lack of housing 
affordability and a social safety net is a reflection of the city’s colonial roots and the 
inability of the post-independence government to provide the city with adequate 
infrastructure for the rapidly growing urban population. The national and local 
governments have long battled with overcrowding and a lack of satisfactory 
infrastructure and public services, which ultimately cripples economic productivity and 
makes vulnerable city-dwellers susceptible to both extreme poverty and disease.  
 Since the start of Zambia’s economic decline in the 1980s, the government has 
attempted economic development through support from international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as 
aggressively trying to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through the privatization of 
state assets such as the copper mines. Recognizing its lack of infrastructure, the Zambian 
government has strategically placed its efforts in building infrastructure in the country’s 
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urban centers. Due to corresponding interests, overtime Zambia has forged a strong 
relationship with China in which the infrastructure loans previously discussed in chapter 
one are implemented in Zambian cities, particularly Lusaka, because of its high level of 
connectivity due to road integration.127 China currently holds the most loan contracts in 
Zambia’s infrastructure building sector; China finances a massive eighty-three percent of 
the industry.128 Whereas China sometimes receives praise for supposedly alleviating 
Zambia’s economic and technological gaps, it is important to remain critical of any 
exterior forces and influences within the African continent, especially from advanced and 
economically developed nation-states such as China. China’s enlarging influence in 
Zambia (as well as the rest of Africa) through resource- and asset-based loans for 
infrastructure has raised concern as to whether or not China is a neo-colonial force within 
Zambia. The question becomes, is China utilizing its foreign aid assistance programs 
(which incorporates FDI) to produce economic dependency through “debt-trap 
diplomacy” to assert institutional change and alter economic development in Zambia?  
Kwame Nkrumah was the first President of Ghana from 1957, when he led the 
nation to independence from British colonial rule until 1966 when he was ousted from 
political power after Ghana’s military organized a coup against him.129 It’s fitting that as 
the first president of sub-Saharan Africa’s first sovereign nation, Nkrumah was also one 
of the earliest African scholars to address neo-colonialism. In his seminal book, Neo-
Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, published in 1965, he conceptualized that 
the “essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
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independent and has all of the outward trappings of international sovereignty [when] in 
reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.”130 
Nkrumah emphasizes that investment acts as a “revolving credit” that is paid by the neo-
colonial force to the neo-colonized country, and then returned to the neo-colonial force 
with increased profits.131 According to Nkrumah, governing African elites serve as 
facilitators of the process by receiving investment as direct payments for running the neo-
colonized state, resulting in exploitation, increased gaps between developed (read rich) 
and developing (read poor) countries, and the domestic inability of neo-colonized 
countries to support industrialization thus making development nearly impossible.   
Nkrumah addresses the deceptiveness of neo-colonialism by explaining that its 
attractiveness is the possibility of improving local quality of life, but its objective is to 
reduce local living standards for the sake of the economic gain of the neo-colonial 
country.132 He supposes that “it is only when this contradiction is understood that the 
failure of innumerable ‘aid’ programs, many of them well-intentioned, can be 
explained.”133 In general, Nkrumah considered neo-colonialism as “the worst form of 
imperialism [explaining that] for those who practice it, it means power without 
responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.”134 
Referencing China’s supposed non-interventionist policy approach to financing urban 
infrastructure projects in Lusaka, China maintains the economic dependency of Zambia. 
Zambian economic dependence is contingent on its increasing desire and need for 
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infrastructure to build-up debt without China having to claim responsibility for Zambia’s 
dwindling economy, ultimately taking advantage of the fact that Zambia was never able 
to build a prosperous independent economy post-independence. Whereas neo-colonialism 
is sometimes described as an imperial force penetrating its former colonies through 
economic power, this specific analysis assumes otherwise. In the case of Sino-Zambian 
relations, this analysis conceptualizes that neo-colonialism can be experienced when a 
developed, imperial, and economic powerhouse, like China, can economically penetrate 
(with the assistance of the African state and its ruling elites) and create a dependency 
from a lesser developed (and formerly colonized) country, like Zambia. China can be a 
neo-colonial force regardless of whether or not Beijing has previously colonized Zambia. 
What is more important than whether or not China previously colonized Zambia is 
China’s capability of assuming a neo-colonial position of power due to its long-standing 
position as an imperial force that has a history of using its foreign policy to extend its 
power and influence. Zambia’s neo-dependency upon China has replaced its old Western 
model of economic dependency and has gradually shifted upwards China’s position as a 
global economic powerhouse. There are a multitude of reasons in which the Sino-
Zambian relationship is perceived as neo-colonial. These reasons span from the Chinese 
use of debt-traps, the extraction of raw materials with limited support of local 
industrialization, the inherent power imbalance in the relationship, the predatory nature of 
purposefully seeking out politically weak countries and the Chinese economy benefiting 
more than the Zambian economy. Through this lens, it becomes obvious that Chinese 
foreign policy like the One Belt One Road Initiative is a tool to advance neo-dependency 
under the guise of aid and solidarity.  
 48 
Ultimately, whereas the Sino-Zambian relationship has previously been praised, 
over time it has become clear that power is inherently unequally distributed and that 
despite promising positive results, Chinese loan-funded urban infrastructure projects in 
Lusaka are a tool to deepen Zambia’s crisis of economic development and foster neo-
colonialism.  
Analyzing the Sino-Zambian “All-Weather Friendship” as Neo-colonial  
The relationship between China and Zambia has been described as “one of the 
richest historical records on China’s cooperation with the [African] continent.” 135 
Allegiances between China and Zambia first formed when China supported Zambia 
during its fight for independence. After achieving independence from Britain in 1964, the 
following three presidents fondly declared an “’all-weather’ friendship,” between the two 
countries.136 China first demonstrated its comradery to Zambia when it provided the 
country with an alternative to relying on its former colonial power, Britain, for imports 
when it funded the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Zambia to 
Tanzania through heavy rail. Since then, Zambia and China have mostly maintained a 
positive economic relationship, as China has continuously supplied Zambia with 
assistance is its agriculture, healthcare, education, and most relevant, infrastructure 
sectors.137 In return, Zambia has remained a close diplomatic ally to China. Zambia 
closely supported China in its struggle to reclaim its seat on the United Nations Security 
Council in 1971.138 In this regard, the relationship between the two countries can be 
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described as symbiotic. They hold a strategic partnership in which they often trade 
political backing, natural resources, development potential, and global economic power. 
  Zambia is often described as “China’s Perfect Storm,” because of it struggles with 
democratic consolidation and its commodity-based economy.139 Convincingly 
highlighting Beijing’s calculated approach to foreign policy. The Sino-Zambian 
relationship was perceived as forward-looking up until 2006, when Zambian politician, 
Michael Sata, publicly exposed the discontent Zambian citizens had with the country’s 
close relationship with China by campaigning on a platform to rid Zambia of its Chinese 
presence. Comprehensively, there are “three phases of the Sino-Zambian relationship, 
driven by solidarity, geopolitics, and geo-economics.” 140 This expansive partnership has 
managed to entwine the trade, aid, and investment domains into a path for economic 
growth and development, which has been made possible through the extraction of raw 
materials and the construction of urban infrastructure projects in Zambia’s urban centers.  
China’s infrastructure loans to Zambia have been used for building projects such 
as roads, railways, sports arena and airports. China is now, “the primary source of new 
direct investment in Zambia and has over 140 officially recorded [infrastructure] projects 
covering various sectors.”141 Nonetheless, financing urban infrastructure has been a 
founding principle of the Sino-Zambian relationship since 1967. In fact, between 1967 
(only three years after Zambia declared its independence) and 2006, Chinese loans to 
Zambia amounted to roughly ¥1,413 million renminbi.142 However, it was not until the 
2000s that the Sino-Zambian relationship through economic engagement gained even 
more momentum when “bilateral trade grew from $108 million in 2000 to $1.39 billion 
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in 2009 and further to $2.85 billion in 2010, greatly boosted by the dramatic swelling of 
China’s copper imports in recent years. By the end of 2010, China was the second-largest 
destination for Zambian copper exports.”143 The success of Sino-Zambian economic 
engagement in the early 2000s laid the groundwork for the establishment of The Zambia-
China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) in Lusaka, which was the first Sino-African trade and 
economic cooperation zone set up in Africa. Comprehensively, the ZCCZ was built in 
Lusaka to further the interests of both China and Zambia. Whereas Beijing wanted to 
expand its control over Zambia’s copper reservoirs, Lusaka desperately wanted to form 
and develop a manufacturing industry around its mining industry to boost economic 
development.144    
Zambia’s abundance of natural resources is China’s greatest motive for investing 
in Zambia because of the ability to exchange raw materials for the financing of desired 
urban infrastructure. China’s “pace of development and rapid depletion of its natural 
resources has been a driving force in its international diplomatic relations. Accounting for 
the largest population in the world and 5.26% GDP growth in 2011, China’s hunger for 
[natural resources] is prevailing in the international market as they demand 17% of the 
world’s global consumption. With its demand expected to expand by 75% by 2035, 
China is positioning itself to compete aggressively and diplomatically for” the security of 
raw materials.145 Zambia finds itself as the primary focus of China’s foreign policy 
initiatives in Africa because of the ability to consensually exchange the invigoration the 
Zambian economy through manufacturing (through infrastructure) with natural resources 
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(backed by the loans). Zambia’s primary raw exports to China are sugar, tobacco, coffee, 
and copper.146 Copper has long been the leading motive of China’s interest in Zambia. 
Whereas Chinese loan investments in Zambia have gone to a multitude of sectors, the 
majority of Chinese companies invest and operate within the mining sector.147 It is 
anticipated that soon Lusaka with be China’s “metal hub.”148 
 China can be perceived as a neo-colonial force in Zambia because of the manner 
in which natural resources are extracted, which cultivates the development of 
underdevelopment. As previously addressed, China’s appeal to Zambia is its abundance 
of natural resources, which has been referred to as the “new scramble for Africa.”149 This 
is a clear reference to the original scramble for Africa in which the entire continent was 
essentially divided by colonial powers for colonial powers in an effort to extract as many 
resources as possible to manufacture within Europe and advance industrialization, 
feeding European development. Upon default of One Belt One Road urban infrastructure 
loans, as anticipated by the debt-traps, China uses its resource-backed loans to extract 
raw materials like copper from Zambia. Manufacturing happens within China, in which 
products are brought back into Zambia through the same infrastructure China built for 
Zambia. Essentially, “China is swapping its value-added manufactured goods for low-
value-added and raw commodities from” Zambia.150 With limited manufacturing 
happening in Zambia, it is unable to industrialize. The lack of industrialization (and 
therefore development) in Zambia is further pursued by China’s interest in building urban 
infrastructure that facilities the importation of Chinese goods into Zambian cities, instead 
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of the much-needed manufacturing infrastructure. If this process continues Zambia will 
be cursed by underdevelopment for a long time. Ultimately, the extraction of raw 
materials always feels colonial, especially when it is purposefully disrupting the 
development of industrialization. The unequal value in the exchanged materials between 
China and Zambia creates an inherently unequal power dynamic that “indicates that Sino-
African economic relationship is not relations of equals or interdependence, rather it is 
relations of unequal or dependence.”151 Zambia is forced into a trade deficit which further 
promotes underdevelopment.152 With that being said, despite China’s claim of mutual 
benefits, in reality, Zambia has limited bargaining power; it is reliant on China for both 
infrastructure development and manufactured goods.  This imbalance of power has been 
noted by the president of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi Adesina, who 
stated, ‘“the issue that I have seen is the asymmetry of power in the negotiations of the 
[Sino-Zambian] transactions, where you are actually giving your mining rights away just 
because you want to build a superhighway.’”153 The fact of the matter is that China’s neo-
colonial power in Zambia has not gone unnoticed by other African powers, but nothing 
can be done without the initiative of the Zambian government.  
The Sino-Zambian relationship is quite controversial both domestically and 
internationally. Whereas some people believe that China’s investment in Zambia is 
positive because of its ability to provide local people with employment opportunities and 
economic development potential, others argue that the Zambian government is giving too 
much attention to building grand infrastructure and chooses to ignore the daily struggles 
of ordinary Zambians. In an effort to placate domestic and international agents against 
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China’s economic integration with Zambia, Chinese President Xi Jinping has previously 
offered Zambia US $800 million in soft loans while simultaneously eliminating US $350 
million in bilateral debt.154 Unfortunately, since then Zambia has obtained even more 
debt, finding itself in somewhat of a debt crisis. As the Zambian government continues to 
take out massive loans from Beijing to build urban infrastructure in Lusaka (and other 
urban centers throughout Zambia) it struggles to maintain its national debt and balance 
debt servicing with the cost of running the state. Zambia has become dependent upon 
China to finance infrastructure to generate more economic development to be able to both 
operate the country and repay China, but to generate the capital to do so, Zambia feels the 
need to build more, which results in becoming even more indebted to China. 
This cycle is illustrative of China’s setting of debt-traps; in which it is aware the 
Zambian government will undoubtedly struggle to release itself. A debt-trap is the 
strategic leveraging of national debt to create dependency by purposefully giving 
economically vulnerable countries large loans, knowing that they will not be able to 
service those debts. This tactic always results in the indebted countries forcibly giving up 
valuable state-assets upon default.155 Globally China’s use of giving excessive credit to 
vulnerable countries is so well known that the term “debt-trap diplomacy” has been 
constructed to critique its foreign policy strategy. Zambia is no stranger to China’s debt-
trap diplomacy, in fact, the One Belt One Road Initiative is the main apparatus in which 
China was contemporarily able to enter the Zambian economy. Debt-trap diplomacy 
through One Belt One Road can be seen in the way in which China’s continuously 
provides Zambia with excessive lines of debt to build urban infrastructure, despite not 
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having “proper feasibility studies to determine their viability by way of acceptable 
internal rate of return thereby saddling the country with excessive debt, resulting in the 
country being at risk of debt distress according to IMF.”156 This process renders Zambia 
economically dependent on China because it means excessive debt servicing costs that 
take away from Zambia’s ability to effectively manage its national budget, inevitably 
resulting in taking out more unsustainable lines of credit, further exacerbating the debt 
crisis. With that being said, China is very well aware of Zambia’s debt distress and even 
offers itself as an alternative source of funding when other world powers shy away from 
loaning to Zambia because of its unsustainable borrowing. Conclusively, economic 
dependency is the core of neo-colonialism. Nonetheless, to understand Zambia’s current 
economic position in relation to its debts to China one must first understand the root of 
Zambia’s vulnerability to China, which is directly linked with Zambia’s previous nearly 
fifty years of underdevelopment.  
 Since declaring independence from the British on October 24, 1964, Zambia has 
experienced nearly fifty years of underdevelopment. This has resulted in Zambia’s 
economic and political vulnerability and willingness to undertake more debt from China 
for the sake of development. Most importantly, Zambia’s underdevelopment can be 
attributed to Western institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which have 
historically forced the Zambian government to adopt and implement particular neo-liberal 
policies that have been extremely detrimental to the country’s economic development and 
independence in the past. From the 1970s to the 1980s Zambia was considered a middle-
income African country. The country’s per capita income was estimated to be around US 
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$500 in the early 1970s, however by the beginning of the 1980s the per capita income 
declined to US $300 as a reflection of a declining economy due to increasing 
international debts to Western donors. The continuously declining per capita income 
corresponded with a decline in living standards, social services, and a lack of ability to 
finance and maintain urban infrastructure for the growing population.157 By the 1990s 
Zambia’s positioning in the global financial system declined even further. In response, 
the World Bank and IMF externally implemented Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), which was “a painful and immiserating [experience for Zambia] marked by 
deindustrialization.”158 During this time, SAPs were implemented around the African 
continent in efforts to supposedly kickstart economic growth, however in reality, SAPs 
assisted in fostering the widespread underdevelopment of many African nation-states that 
can be seen today.   
 Zambia’s SAPs in the 1990s, “reversed the development successes of the 1960s 
and 1970s, with millions sliding into poverty every year. Even the World Bank had to 
accept the SAPs failed the poor, with a special burden falling on women and children.”159 
Zambia’s SAP policies were based on financial and trade liberalization, monetarism, 
currency devaluation, a dramatic decrease in social spending (particularly in the 
education and poverty reduction sector), the privatization of state assets (such as the 
copper mining industry), and the elimination of government subsidies and price 
controls.160 Comprehensively, these policies created more underdevelopment within 
Zambia. It is possible the country would have been better off managing its post-
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independence public debts independently, rather than with the help of global financial 
institutions.  The West-imposed SAPs were held responsible for increased inequality 
within Zambia, rising unemployment rates, and declining living standards. The Zambian 
public responded with civil unrest, which further impeded growth and delegitimized the 
Zambian state. 161 By the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, there was complete 
distrust of Western development solutions by both the government and the people of 
Zambia. In response, the Zambian government decided to abandon the externally 
imposed SAPs and refused to continue debt servicing to the IMF. In return, nearly every 
Western donor temporarily pulled aid from Zambia, which “learned the hard way not to 
resist” the World Bank and IMF policies.162 Despite distrusting Western development 
solutions, intermittently throughout the 2000s and 2010s Zambia requested development 
funding assistance from the IMF because of a need for external funding. In total, Zambia 
was issued Eurobonds for nearly US $3 billion. As Zambia took out more loans that it 
was unable to repay due to economic crisis and underdevelopment, its creditworthiness 
deteriorated resulting in Western institutions becoming reluctant to finance any more debt 
for Zambia.163 In the past few years, the IMF has rejected Zambian requests for loans 
amounting to approximately US $1.3 billion because “the borrowing plans provided by 
the [Zambian] authorities continue to compromise the country’s debt sustainability and 
risk undermining its macroeconomic stability.”164 From the Western perspective, 
Zambian borrowing for development is risky due to the possibility that the Zambian 
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government took out too many loans and is on the brink of debt default and economic 
collapse.  
 Zambia’s chosen and forceful deviation from Western-imposed development 
solutions have created rather agreeable circumstances for Sino-Zambian relations to 
flourish. Whereas overtime the West has become less likely to give to Zambia due to debt 
sustainability, China is more than willing to continuously loan without regard to 
Zambia’s debt sustainability. To begin, China offers Zambia an alternative development 
model based on non-interference. This policy is appealing to Zambia because it means no 
more invasive and destructive externally imposed economic and political policies like 
those imposed by the previous SAPs. This means that Zambia can maintain international 
funding and investment for development, without having to sacrifice its national 
sovereignty and decision-making capabilities. Additionally, loans from China have much 
more favorable terms. Chinese loans offer interest rates of about two to three percent, 
with nearly fifteen to twenty years given to pay them off, in addition to a five- to seven-
year grace period.165 Additionally, unlike SAPs, the use of Chinese loans has produced 
positive and effective change within Zambia’s urban centers such as improving 
infrastructure which boosts productivity and economic growth.166 Another reason why 
alternative Chinese loan funding is preferential in Zambia is that it provides targeted 
funding based on Zambian interests. China is tapping into Zambia’s desire for improved 
infrastructure, of which Western funding did not. Whereas “debt was once a symptom of 
western capitalist domination, it is now also a sign of China’s grip on countries 
desperately in need of infrastructure and procuring funds through non-concessional loans. 
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These are now thought to account for 77% of Zambia’s total debt.”167 Lastly, Chinese 
loans currently act as a preferred alternative to Western aid as a result of Western 
implemented development solutions because they offer more debt relief. Since 2000, 
Beijing has taken massive steps to alleviate Zambian debts, in which it “wrote off $1.2 
billion in African debt [from thirty-one countries and] in 2003, it forgave another $750 
million”168 Overall, by bypassing a colonial legacy and the implementation of SAPs in 
Africa, continuing to give infrastructural loans when others refuse, providing better debt 
financing, and targeting specific Zambian development interests China has been able to 
establish itself as a standout alternative partner to Zambia. The outcome tends to be a lack 
of criticism of China, despite the opaque nature of Chinese lending, particularly in terms 
of debt sustainability.  
Contextualizing Zambia’s Interest in Chinese Infrastructure Investment and its 
Urban Implications  
 
The fundamental reason in which Zambia (and the rest of Africa) is willing to 
overlook questionable Chinese lending terms is due to the mutual significance China and 
Zambia have placed on the improvement of urban infrastructure as a tool of fostering 
development and economic stability. Many African countries, Zambia particularly, 
struggle with urban infrastructure insufficiency, which generally reduces economic 
productivity by nearly forty percent.169 A seemingly simple solution to boosting 
productivity and escaping the grip of underdevelopment is building more infrastructure; 
nonetheless, “the cost of addressing Africa’s infrastructure shortfalls is estimated at 
around US $93 billion annually.”170 Domestically filling Africa’s infrastructure gap is 
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financially impractical, and very concerning for Zambia because it already trails behind 
most of its African counterparts in adequate infrastructure and further burdens the 
county.171 Studies show that inadequate infrastructure hinders economic productivity in 
Zambia by nearly fifty percent and causes the loss of about US $500 million a year; but, 
if the government achieved adequate infrastructure development to the level of middle-
income countries, its economic performance could grow by nearly three percent per 
capita per year.172 173 Zambia has an infrastructure funding gap of roughly US $500 
million a year, which would be a major problem if wasn’t for Beijing’s intervention 
through infrastructure loans.174 However, now that Zambia can receive funding from 
Beijing, debt sustainability becomes a main concern.  
Zambia was one of the earliest African countries to accept infrastructural 
investment through loans from Beijing, which has remained a “testimony to the 
unbreakable bond shared between Zambia and China.”175 This bond is based on the 
mutual value of infrastructure being ‘“an important driver of development for any 
country. By improving infrastructure, [Zambia] will not only have economic growth but 
also attract [more] investors [because] better and improved infrastructure promotes 
sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth,’” as described by the Minister of 
Housing and Infrastructure, Ronald Chitotela.176 This perspective has driven the core 
objective of Zambia’s current ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF). The need for outside 
funding for infrastructure development explains the rise of Chinese lending in Zambia 
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since the party was elected in 2011.177 With the help of China, in virtually a decade the 
PF has been able to completely transform the urban infrastructural fabric of Zambia, this 
can be easily observed within Lusaka. Nevertheless, research shows that despite China’s 
massive lending to build new and improved infrastructure within Zambian cities like 
Lusaka, the developments only contributes a mere 0.6 percentage point to the yearly per 
capita growth of Zambia’s gross domestic product (GPD).178 With that being said, the 
Zambian government borrows more than is sustainable based on development potential, 
overlooking the actual data on the real impact of development assistance. The Zambian 
government is undoubtedly digging itself into deeper and unbearable debt. Newer urban 
infrastructure projects are doing more to beautify Lusaka (and attract international 
attention) than they are for the development of the city and the economic well-being of 
the country.  
Since the beginning of China’s investment in Zambia in the 1960s, the nature of 
Chinese lending has changed. The evolving nature of Chinese lending to Zambia can be 
observed through the shift in the types (and magnitude) of loans over time, which alludes 
to China’s growing self-interest in economically engaging with Zambia. From the late 
1960s to 2006, the majority of China’s engagement in Zambia went towards grants on 
much-needed relief for Zambia and Sino-Zambian economic and technical cooperation; 
the majority of Sino-Zambian engagement during this time was not through loans. 
Between 1967 and 2006 China spent a massive amount on technical and economic 
cooperation between the two countries, amounting to nearly ¥471 million renminbi.179 In 
the same period of time, China gave grants targeting economic relief for Zambia, giving 
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nearly ¥20 million renminbi for causes ranging from relief food, cash, equipment, 
medicine, and general goods.180 By comparing the sums that China spent on economic 
and technical cooperation and relief packages, it becomes clear that Sino-Zambian 
economic engagement has always been at the forefront of China’s motivation to engage 
with Zambia. Chinese infrastructural loans make up a very small percentage of Sino-
Zambian economic engagement from 1967 to 2006. In those nearly forty years, Beijing 
gave Zambia loans for four urban infrastructure projects. The first being the Tazara 
railway in 1967 for ¥484 million renminbi, followed by a ¥50 million renminbi loan for 
road rehabilitation in 1987, a US $8 million loan for a new government complex in 
Lusaka in 1995, and a ¥120.9 million renminbi loan for a new government complex (and 
unidentified “special loan”) in 2002.181 These early infrastructure loans represent China’s 
realization of the amount of profits that could be made through such lending practices, 
signifying a change in China’s investment after the privatization of Zambia’s copper 
mines which increased Chinese investment in the 2000s. Such infrastructure development 
lending practices can be described as white elephant development, in which China 
realized it could foster increased profits through Zambian economic dependence. White 
elephant development is urban infrastructure projects in which the initial cost, 
maintenance, and debt servicing of the project end up being greater than its local profits. 
Perhaps the most illustrative of white elephant development is the Tazara railway. As 
previously mentioned, in 1967 China lent ¥484 million renminbi to Zambia to build the 
Tazara railway, however, lending didn’t stop there. The maintenance of the Tazara 
railway ended up being much more than expected, in which Zambia couldn’t afford and 
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needed to continuously request Chinese loans to fund. Only two years after the initial 
loan for the construction of the Tazara railway, Zambia received a ¥5.58 million renminbi 
loan for twelve locomotives. This is followed by a ¥5 million renminbi loan for spare 
parts in 1986, a ¥52 million renminbi loan given to Zambia for Tazara locomotives and 
technical training in 1999, and two unspecified loans regarding Tazara amounting to ¥21 
million renminbi in 2004 and 2006182 Comprehensively, the Tazara railway cost Zambian 
officials nearly ¥83 million renminbi more than initially expected, on top of the original 
¥484 million renminbi that the Zambian government couldn’t afford in the first place. By 
requiring massive initial investment and continuous borrowing overtime, white elephant 
development became Beijing’s primary mechanism to build Zambian debt.  
China’s current neo-colonial engagement in Zambia through One Belt One Road 
is centered on white elephant development. China’s One Belt One Road projects in 
Zambia cost massive initial investment, followed by continuous borrowing for 
maintenance and debt servicing, which is greater than Zambian profits made through the 
project. Since the inception and implementation of One Belt One Road in 2013, China’s 
white elephant development has taken over Lusaka’s urban landscape. In 2013, Zambian 
officials borrowed US $300 million for Lusaka’s L400 roads, and in 2014 they borrowed 
US $360 million for the renovation of Zambia’s national airport in Lusaka, the Kenneth 
Kaunda International Airport.183 The year 2015 was a heavy borrowing year for Zambian 
officials as they borrowed US $130 million for the Lusaka sanitation project, US $90 
million for the renovation of the Levy Mwanawasa Hospital (Zambia’s national hospital), 
US $275 million for a housing project for employees of Zambia’s national security 
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department, and US $1.7 billion for the Kafue Gorge Lower Power Plant (90 km outside 
of Lusaka).184 Two years later, 2017 was also a heavy borrowing year for Lusaka. 
Officials borrowed US $286 million for the Lusaka de-congestion project, US $157 
million for the construction of 2,000 military homes, and US $280 million for the 
construction of communication towers in Lusaka and around Zambia.185 Honorable 
mention of a white elephant infrastructure project funded by Chinese lending slightly 
before One Belt One Road is the renovation of Lusaka’s National Heroes Stadium, which 
cost US $94 million in 2011. Between 2006 and 2011, Zambia’s previous ruling political 
party borrowed extensively, amounting to US $3.5 billion, but little information is given 
on where these funds were utilized. 186 Since 2017, Zambia’s borrowing through One 
Belt One Road has not slowed down, some might argue that it has picked up. 
The construction of these One Belt One Road development projects is done by 
Chinese construction companies, which signifies yet another reason in which China is a 
neo-colonial force in Zambia. The Chinese economy benefits significantly more than the 
Zambian economy, which promotes even more underdevelopment. Considerable 
“evidence suggests that a substantial part of concessional loans have been used by China 
as a tool to open the gates for Chinese construction” companies in Lusaka.187 As 
previously stated in chapter one, the majority of One Belt One Road infrastructure 
projects are funded by the China Exim Bank. The bank requires that at least fifty percent 
of contractors for the funded project to be Chinese.188 Whereas this could have a positive 
impact on Zambian companies by establishing a transfer in skills and technology, it is not 
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because “Chinese [companies tend to claim] that they find it very difficult to identify 
appropriate African sources and partners for their needs and that project completion and 
quality could be compromised in such compliance.”189 Chinese construction companies 
import their equipment and labor from China, allowing them to elude the responsibility of 
hiring Zambians and working with Zambian companies. Therefore, working-class 
Zambians are gaining very little from the actual building of the infrastructure; they are 
neither gaining capital which would stimulate the economy from within, nor receiving 
any sort of information, skills, or technology transfer in which they could replicate. Yet 
again, this fosters the development of underdevelopment in Zambia at the hands of 
China. China is not only setting debt-traps to ensure dependency in which it will benefit 
in the long-term based on interest payments but also building quick wealth by paying 
itself through contracting.190  
Conclusively, these projects have visually changed Lusaka’s urban landscape, but 
the real concern is if they have fulfilled Zambia’s goals and intentions for the projects. 
With these projects, Zambian officials intended to boost development by increasing local 
services, quality of life within Lusaka, and global economic connectivity. In reviewing 
these intentions, it becomes unfortunately clear that One Belt One Road projects in 
Zambia have only improved services and quality of life for middle-class Zambians with 
the privilege to live within Lusaka’s formal housing sector, afford vehicles, air travel and 
up-to-date technology. These projects do little for ordinary, working-class Zambian’s that 
cannot afford these luxuries because they do not have access. As for increasing Zambia’s 
global economic connectivity, since 2016 Lusaka has been ranked a gamma city by the 
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Globalization and World Cities Research Network after years of honorable mentions as 
sufficiency and high sufficiency.191 However, it is not clear as to whether or not it was 
specifically Chinese investment that made this possible, or rather the increased FDI from 
all of Zambia’s neo-colonial forces (being the West and IFIs). Nevertheless, in choosing 
to continue to borrow from China for these One Belt One Road projects, Zambia is 
choosing to pursue global economic connectivity and national development over the 
improved lives of ordinary Zambians. In focusing on large-scale development made 
possible by outside sources of investment, Zambian officials are relying on a trickle-
down development structure, in which positive effects never actually trickle down to 
those at the very bottom.  
China’s presence in Lusaka has transformed its urban landscape not only through 
the construction of urban infrastructure but also through the construction of suburban 
communities in Lusaka’s periphery where the informal settlements mentioned previously 
are located. Chinese immigrants tend to reside in Lusaka’s middle- and upper-class 
neighborhoods around the city, as well as in gated communities in the city’s suburbs, 
such as Lusaka’s Millennium Village.192 The Henan-Guoji Development Company, (the 
company that built Millennium Village) has also developed Silverest Gardens, another 
gated community only 10 kilometers from Lusaka’s airport. For a grand US $200,000 
Silverest Gardens offers its residents its own shopping mall, gym, police station, 
landscaping services, home servicing, and waste collection services. The majority of 
those that bought homes in Silverest Gardens are international investors, sometimes 
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buying nearly a dozen at once. 193 Even if Zambian families were wealthy enough to 
purchase homes, they were frequently still excluded for their lack of buying power. In 
regard to the services provided within the gated community, life in Silverest Gardens 
appears to be completely self-sufficient. Those that live within the community are rarely 
ever required to leave, therefore fostering deeper isolation and separation between 
residents of Lusaka and Chinese expatriates.   
 Furthermore, despite claiming community ties in its brochure, Silverest Gardens 
will not provide housing for the presumably Zambian blue-collar workers that will be 
servicing the homes in the community. The lack of provided housing for these Zambian 
service workers will most likely lead to the formation of an informal settlement nearby 
because of the need for workers to be able to easily access their places of employment. 
However, this will further expose the clear economic inequality because Zambians and 
Chinese expatriates, which will most likely cause more tension between the two groups. 
The establishment of peri-urban gated communities such as Silverest Gardens does not 
only lead to the formation of informal settlements nearby but also has a tendency to 
displace established informal settlements. For instance, in June of 2013, the Kampasa 
settlement was forcibly removed, with violence, when the land it resided on was sold 
without notification to a Chinese development firm.194 Moreover, the growing presence 
of gated communities as a result of Chinese investment in Lusaka is raising real estate 
prices well beyond the financial capabilities of the ordinary Zambian.195 Through the 
destruction of Lusaka’s informal communities at the hands of Chinese development and 
construction companies, it becomes clear that mass displacement is a new feature to 
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modern neo-colonialism. Conclusively, Chinese investment in peri-urban gated 
communities for Chinese expatriates is further dividing Lusaka, which explains the 
violent outbursts across the city between Zambians and Chinese residents to be addressed 
in chapter three.  
Recognizing Zambia’s Agency and its Resulting Economic Isolation  
 
It has been established that China’s expansive lending presence in Lusaka 
legitimizes China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia. The Zambian government’s 
reluctance to do anything about China’s neo-colonial presence is a reflection of China’s 
strategic use of choosing to economically engage with politically weak countries, as well 
as the personal agency of Zambian ruling elites, and the Zambian government’s national 
agency. Whereas usually African countries that rank highly in political stability attract 
high levels of FDI, China takes the opposite approach. Beijing seeks to give the majority 
of its FDI to politically weak countries that are underinvested in order to increase 
government enthusiasm to comply.196 With that, the bargaining power of Beijing 
instantaneously increases due to its leveraging of the Zambian government’s desire for 
FDI. In consideration of the foregoing, China’s practice of seeking out politically weak 
countries like Zambia is predatory and suggests that China is not choosing its partners 
based on positive diplomatic relationships; instead, it is based upon the ability to take 
advantage of the local government due to having little bargaining power. Some of 
Zambia’s political weakness can be attributed to corruption within the government, in 
which “corruption chips away at democracy to produce a vicious cycle, where corruption 
undermines democratic institutions and, in turn, weak institutions are less able to control 
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corruption.”197 Contemporarily the matter of corruption within the Zambian government 
has emerged in the context of FDI because of the exposure of Zambian public officials 
and senior cabinet members urging for more FDI “as a resource for private accumulation 
at the expense of the public.” 198 Zambian ruling elites’ self-interest in FDI is not specific 
to Zambia, as post-colonial African states became one of the very few areas in which 
African elites can profit. Corrupt Zambian officials’ self-interest suggests their agency of 
personal profit makes them less critical of Chinese FDI. Despite a lack of definite figures 
on how much corrupt politicians are able to financially benefit from Chinese FDI, it does 
not change the fact that they are motivated by their own personal agency. These corrupt 
politicians continue to borrow from China, knowingly placing their own agency above 
what is best for the country. Because it is their own interest that assists in advancing 
Chinese FDI, these Zambian officials are not passive victims of China’s foreign policy. 
This goes to say that China’s interest in and engagement with Zambia is not a reflection 
of historically rooted positive diplomatic relations (as has been falsely advertised), but 
instead by China’s ability to build economic dependency and impose neo-colonial 
policies partially because of the financial greed of corrupt Zambian elites to 
independently profit from China’s investment. 
Aside from the personal agency of Zambian governing elites, China’s neo-
colonial presence is to a certain extent, the exertion of the Zambian government’s 
national power. Currently, Zambia finds itself in a no-win situation based on the 
excessive and seemingly uncontrollable debts the country owes to Western powers, 
global financial institutions and China (along with other BRICS countries that have 
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provided FDI). Despite the mass construction of urban infrastructure, the country is still 
unable to achieve the development it so desperately desires and needs for economic 
independence because it is borrowing at greater rates than the economy is able to grow. 
Zambia’s excessive national debt renders the country to inevitably be economically 
dependent, with the prospect of economic independence anytime soon being low. Having 
said that, from the Zambian perspective, there are enough external powers that are willing 
to give much more funding to Zambia than the country is able to repay, therefore by 
choosing who to economically engage with, the Zambian government is exerting its 
decision-making power. This is not to be confused with the idea that Zambia is choosing 
to be economically colonized, as that is not the case. Zambia’s economic dependency has 
long been determined by exterior forces reaching as far back into its colonization. 
However, if a neo-colonial presence is inevitable because economic independence is not 
feasible, then choosing which neo-colonial force Zambia prefers becomes an empowering 
bargaining tool of the Zambian government. Whereas it is unfortunate that economic 
dependency is the reality of the Zambian economy, it is critical to comprehend that by 
presenting China as a monstrous neo-colonial force in Zambia, in which the Zambian 
government has limited control over, one is feeding into the oversimplified narrative that 
Zambia (and more generally speaking, Africa) is the timeless victim of globalization. In 
reality, the Zambian government is voluntarily seeking out more debt from China, despite 
redundant warnings that the country is on the brink of a debt crisis, to fulfill its political 
and economic objectives. Asserting that China is taking advantage of the alleged naïveté 
of Zambian officials neglects to take into account the Zambian government’s agency. 
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Under that oversimplified assumption, the Zambian government is unaware of the debt 
obligations it has agreed to undertake, which is not true. The argument that Zambia’s 
neo-colonialism is contingent upon its own agency does not relieve China of 
responsibility for the predatory nature of its foreign economic policy in the way that it 
takes advantage of underdevelopment and falsely claims mutual benefit. However, it 
acknowledges that the neo-colonial relationship between China and Zambia requires 
voluntary commitment on both sides. Just as the Chinese government should be held 
liable to rein in its predatory neo-colonial foreign policy, the Zambian government should 
be held responsible for asserting its agency in a manner that continuously negatively 
affects ordinary Zambians for the sake of development, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
The Sino-African relationship, particularly when referencing foreign aid, cannot 
be discussed without mentioning the Western (European and American) influence and 
perspective. This is because China’s first economic engagement in Africa stemmed from 
an African “aid war” between China, the United States Peace Corps, and the Soviet 
Union.199 The competition between China and the West over Africa through debt 
financing continues contemporarily. China currently leads the way after having replaced 
“traditional Western lenders as the region’s largest creditor, accounting for 14% of sub-
Saharan Africa’s total debt stock. This shift was informed by both a focus on 
infrastructure development by African governments and China’s [over] willingness to 
lend on the continent.”200 As the Sino-African relationship becomes more deeply 
 
199 Aniche, 12.  
200 Were, 3.  
 71 
entrenched through debt financing and bilateral trade, Western, particularly United 
States-African, bilateral trade, and debt financing steeply declines.201  
Furthermore, when conceptualizing Western and Chinese presence on the African 
continent as neo-colonial, the rivalry between China and the West increases. Despite the 
fact that “the West has never been a friend of Africa and has never been interested in its 
development but rather wanted to perpetuate dependency,” it is highly critical of the 
Sino-African relationship.202 Western critiques of China in Africa tend to be Sino-phobic, 
relying on long-standing rhetoric that China is a predatory force that neither cares about 
the economic development of African state nor cares about the human rights of Africans. 
Nevertheless, these critiques of China in Africa are hypocritical because the Western 
presence in Africa has long been driven by its national economic interests, not by its 
supposed noble pursuit of improving human rights on the continent. It is not just Western 
nation-states that are critical of Sino-African relations. The IMF and World Bank hold 
similar hypocritical beliefs.203 It is nonsensical for the IMF and World Bank to critique 
China in Africa for doing the same thing that they have done for decades in Africa, which 
is, “providing unsustainable loans to countries in need to further plunge them into debt, 
weaken state capacity and open up national economies to international investors.”204 
However, it is important to note that both institutions, despite being global entities, are 
Western-led. Seemingly Western powers have forgotten the detrimental influences they 
have had on the African continent, the most obvious being enslavement and colonization. 
It was the implementation of these catastrophic forces that originally fostered the 
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underdevelopment of Africa, which still haunts the continent today. The long-endured 
underdevelopment of Africa is what makes the continent vulnerable to Chinese economic 
influence in the first place. In reality, Western critiques of Sino-African relations are a 
reflection of China being a threat to the United States hegemony and the fear that China 
will enable African nations, such as Zambia, to free themselves from Western debt and 
political influence. Comprehensively, the West (both nation-states and institutions) is 
afraid of losing its grip on Zambia in what has been described as the new scramble for 
Africa. The Eastern and Western rivalry for Zambia’s economic dependence further 
propels China’s embeddedness in Zambia. China relies on increasing Chinese hegemony 
in Zambia to slowly but surely push other forces out of Zambia. China’s presence in 
Zambia doesn’t just isolate it from the West, but also the rest of Africa. Zambia’s curated 
dependence on China through the One Belt One Road Initiative interrupts intra-African 
trade because Zambia trades more with China than its African counterparts. Whereas 
intra-regional trade percentages in the European Union, Asia, and North America are 
above thirty percent, intra-African trade remains a low ten percent. 205 China’s presence 
in Africa, mainly possible through One Belt One Road, externally disrupts African 
economic and political integration by placing itself in the center of the African economy. 
It seems fair to say that China’s presence in Zambia’s urban centers does more 
undermining of the economy than it does to boost.   
China’s presence in Lusaka in indeed neo-colonial because of how it utilizes 
foreign policy to promote its economic agenda in the wake of Zambia’s economic 
dependency by fostering debt-traps and underdevelopment. Economic dependency for 
Zambia anytime soon is a bleak prospect. With that being said, it is critical that the 
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analysis of Zambia’s neo-colonization takes into account that China’s presence is the 
exertion of the Zambian government’s power. Out of all of the external forces that are 
interested in taking advantage of its economic vulnerability, Zambia is choosing to 
cooperate with China because of mutual interests. This is important because it allows 
space to recognize Zambia’s agency, instead of perpetuating African countries as 
permanent victims in the global order. In that regard, it is clear that China has a distinct 
strategy for Zambia, but Zambia lacks a finite strategy for China. I propose that it is only 
when Zambia defines a specific approach for its Chinese affairs that there will be a 
chance to level out the unequal nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship. Zambia’s lack of 
strategy is what allows Western narratives of Zambia is a victim to drown out Zambia’s 
agency. Especially when in reality these Western powers are spreading Sino phobic 
narratives, despite also using foreign policy to foster neo-colonialism in Zambia. 
Presently, aid operates as “merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master, 
passing through the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the 
form of increased profits.”206  At the forefront of the Zambian government’s agenda 
should be two main objectives. The first being to find a way to achieve debt 
sustainability. It is predicted by the end of 2020 Zambia’s sovereign debt will reach 
ninety-six percent of its GDP, despite defaulting on a multitude of loans in 2019.207 There 
desperately needs to be a way to breakdown Zambia’s debt to find a sustainable way to 
repay, however, this would require not taking out any more debt, which does not seem to 
be an alluring option to the government. Secondly, the Zambian government needs to 
find a way to effectively communicate how Chinese loan-funded urban infrastructural 
 
206 Nkrumah, 11.  
207 Smith.  
 74 
projects will benefit the ordinary Zambian because ss of now, there is great fragmentation 
between the Zambian government and its people. A large part of making things right with 
the Zambian public would require altering the clauses in Sino-Zambian agreements to 
ensure that productivity for the Zambian economy is written into dealings. All in all, 
there is potential for an evening of the power dynamics of Sino-Zambian relations, 
particularly for the building of infrastructure in Lusaka. However, the Zambian 
government needs to be more proactive in making sure its own needs are being met.  
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Investors or “Infesters”?: Social Fragmentation and the Rise of 
Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Lusaka 
 
“’We've had bad people here before. The whites were bad, the Indians worse, but the Chinese are 
worst of all.’”208 
 
After independence in 1964, Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, referred 
to Sino-Zambian relations as an “all-weather friendship”.209 This enthusiastic sentiment 
has been repeated by proceeding presidents in efforts to defend deeper economic 
engagement with China. The positive political and civil portrayal of China became a 
point of friction in 2006 when the “national elections marked a clear point of departure 
and introduced a new element to the picture: political and popular opposition to 
China.”210 Political representation came as a response to the widespread dissatisfaction of 
the Sino-Zambian relationship by Zambian residents. Despite cohesive macro-level 
engagement, on the micro-level, China’s presence in Zambia, particularly in urban 
centers like Lusaka, was and continues to be, a point of friction and discontent. It became 
clear that the Zambian public does not value China’s longstanding presence as highly as 
the previous governments. The reason is, whereas Zambia was able to capitalize on 
China’s engagement by strengthening its political status, very little has been done to 
improve the lives of ordinary Zambians. The failure of Chinese investment to benefit 
residents highlights an oversight on the research of the Sino-Zambian relationship. 
Whereas much research focuses on international economic implications, very little 
attention is given to the local implications and perceptions.  
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In this regard, it has become clear that Lusaka’s growing Chinese presence has 
begun to agitate locals resulting in xenophobia and national political tension.211 Local 
tensions within Lusaka have become increasingly intense. Since 2006, the Zambian 
capital has become one of the most contentious points of Chinese opposition in Africa, 
with increasing instances of anti-Chinese looting, rioting, protesting.212 This xenophobic 
violence targets the Chinese nationals that have immigrated to Zambia by the thousands 
in the wake of increasing Chinese investment. In support of my analysis, Zambians in 
Lusaka tend to perceive China as a dominant force which results in great friction between 
the Zambian and Chinese populations. This friction is further exacerbated by the media 
and the Patriotic Front, a political party that used anti-Chinese frustrations as a “central 
rallying” issue in the 2006, 2008, and 2011 presidential elections. The combination of 
agitation from the media and Patriotic Front results in anger being misdirected at Chinese 
nationals in Lusaka, instead of the origins of anti-Chinese frustrations, which are the 
Chinese and Zambian governments. Whereas Zambians are frustrated with China’s 
perceived “take over” of their country, they are equally upset at Zambian officials for 
allowing China to do so.213  
Zambian Perceptions of China as a Neo-colonial Force in Lusaka 
 
The Zambian government “finds itself as a crossroads in its development path. 
For years Zambians have grown more and more frustrated with how their government has 
conducted its relationship with Beijing, with many believing that [Zambian government 
has] allowed Chinese companies to flaunt national legislation to the detriment of the local 
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populations development.”214 Chinese investment in Zambia facilitated increased copper 
prices and the revival of the mining industry, the backbone of the Zambian economy.215 
This shift to favorable economic conditions should translate into increased quality of life 
for Zambians, but it does not. Ordinary Zambian citizens do not receive quality 
redistributive effects. In 2019, Zambia ranked 143 out of 189 countries on the Human 
Development Index, bringing into question whether or not China’s FDI has any positive 
impact on Zambian quality of life.216  
Drawing on a three-month field study from December 2011 to February 2012 in 
Zambia, researchers asked the questions: “What positive impact does the presence of 
Chinese people in Zambia have on Zambia?” and “What negative impacts do Chinese 
people in Zambia have on Zambia?”217 The results showed that although there is no 
definite benchmark to determine fixed levels of prejudice, there is a general anti-Chinese 
sentiment. Slightly over fifty percent of the participants expected to dislike Chinese 
migrants; “this implies that even though there is no real dislike for Chinese people among 
respondents, it cannot be argued that there is not a general fondness of them either.”218 
Zambians’ issues with Chinese people stems from an antipathy of the Chinese 
government’s power over the Zambian government, which results in negative 
implications of the lives of ordinary Zambians.  
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As previously mentioned, in support of my analysis, many Zambians in Lusaka 
tend to perceive China as a dominating and predatory force in Zambia, which manifests 
in animosity between Zambians and Chinese nationals. Although many Zambians do not 
have the scholarly vocabulary to directly label China as neo-colonial, they acknowledge 
China as employing cultural, political, and economic hegemony over Zambia, in which 
Zambia is being taken over by China. Essentially, many Zambians acknowledge China as 
fitting a neo-colonial definition, without actually explicitly calling China neo-colonial. 
With that being said, the sentiment of neo-colonialism is just as important as directly 
identifying China as neo-colonial.  
 One of the primary reasons ordinary Zambians feel that China is taking over 
Zambia is the increasing visual signs of China’s presence and economic integration and 
dependency. For instance, as a result of an asset-backed loan, the Zambian government is 
very close to being forced to hand over ZESCO, the nation’s electricity company, 
because of an inability to service the debt that paid for ZESCO’s national infrastructure. 
Regardless of whether or not the Chinese government repossesses ZESCO, many 
Zambians in Lusaka suffer from 20-hour per day power cuts due to the inability to 
financially sustain the company.219 Similar fears plague the future of Zambia’s national 
airport, the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in Lusaka, because of an inability to 
service the Chinese debt that paid for the airport.220 China taking over Zambia’s national 
assets would mean that ordinary Zambians would be putting their money into the pockets 
of the Chinese government - as is already the case with Zambia’s broadcasting system, 
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ZNBC, which was repossessed by China because of an asset-backed loan.221  
Additionally, as of mid-2018, Zambians were reliably informed that nearly half of all 
property taxes paid from selling a house goes to the Chinese government for national debt 
servicing.222 The increasing visual of Zambians putting their money into the pockets of 
the Chinese government enforces Zambian beliefs that China is taking over the country’s 
economy.  
 Furthermore, Zambians growing frustration with China’s ever-increasing visual 
presence in Zambia is also fueled by an increase in Chinese people in traditionally 
exclusively Zambian spaces. In December of 2017, the Zambian police force employed 
eight Chinese nationals as police offices in Lusaka. This came as a great indignity to 
Zambians; there was so much protest in the following twenty-four hours that the Chinese 
officers were fired before their first day on duty.223 Zambians in Lusaka were insulted by 
the appointed Chinese police officers because they felt China was taking over Zambian 
sovereignty. One Lusaka resident explained, “‘when we see a uniform of the police, it 
signifies our identity. It signifies our sovereignty. How would we be feeling to see a 
police officer and be saluting a Chinese [national] in our own country?’”224 The belief is 
that only Zambians should police Zambians, not outsiders. In fact, “not even Zambians 
with dual-nationality are allowed to join the police,”225 because they are still an agent of 
an outside country. The visual that China is taking over Zambia can also be seen in the 
Chinese-built special economic zone in Lusaka in which banks use the Chinese renminbi 
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instead of Zambia’s national currency, the kwacha.226 Similarly to the police uniform, the 
national currency is a representation of sovereignty. To Zambians, the visual of the 
Chinese renminbi at a bank in Zambia alludes to diminishing sovereignty and a clear 
reminder of Chinese hegemony in Lusaka. Another traditionally exclusively Zambian 
space in Lusaka that Zambians feel the increasing Chinese presence is the Soweto 
Market, the backbone of the informal economy in Lusaka. Chinese sellers import Chinese 
products that can be sold at lower prices than African products, therefore “local 
traders…find themselves undercut and displaced by Chinese imported products.”227 One 
Lusaka resident explained “that ‘the recent arrival of Chinese traders in the grimy alleys 
of Soweto market in Lusaka [has] halved the cost of chicken. Cabbage prices dropped by 
65%... ‘How dare the Chinese disturb our market.’”228 This results in “disputes and 
threat[s] that are often seen as a cause for prejudice and ethnic conflict.”229 Xenophobia 
becomes an outlet for expressing disgruntlement of China’s perceived takeover of 
Lusaka.  
The second reason ordinary Zambians feel that China is a neo-colonial force in 
Zambia is the abominable working conditions for Zambian miners, which has been 
compared to slavery. Previously a job in the copper mines ensured better living standards 
for Zambian families; workers used to be able to support their family in Lusaka and 
extended family in rural Zambia.230  With the rise of Chinese-owned mines, this is no 
longer the case. Zambian miners work long hours in atrocious conditions without 
personal protection equipment, leaving them exposed to harsh gases and chemicals. 
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Additionally, the majority of Zambian mine employees are not given permanent 
contracts, instead they work on rolling and fixed-term contracts, ultimately making 
employment volatile and inconsistent.231 Lastly, violence against Zambians by Chinese 
employers and the lack of action taken by the Chinese government fuels Zambian anti-
Chinese notions that the Chinese are a neo-colonial force in Zambia. Anti-Chinese 
tensions “are a reaction to [the] Chinese scramble for Africa’s resources and the 
exploitative work conditions instituted by its firms. A few have gone to call China a new 
colonial power in Africa.”232 Aside from the notes of colonialism as expressed by 
Zambian miners, Zambian frustrations come from feeling as though China is changing 
aspects of Zambian life. Mining, which was once a reliable source of sufficient income 
has evolved into an unnecessarily dangerous and unstable job, leaving many Zambian 
families stranded with limited options.  
As resentment of China’s predatory presence in Zambia becomes more outwardly 
expressed, Zambians that are not “directly affected by the Chinese, may become 
predisposed against Chinese people.” 233 Legitimate conflicts over the exploitative nature 
of the Sino-Zambian relationship mix with cultural differences to create negative 
“perceptions of Chinese people that have become embedded in the Zambian mind.”234 
Ultimately, the xenophobic anti-Chinese sentiment in Lusaka does not stem from racism, 
but governmental frustrations. Xenophobia is simply an easily accessible tool to take out 
Zambian frustrations with the Chinese government; Chinese nationals in Lusaka become 
scapegoats for the Chinese government.  
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“Zambia for Zambians”: Local Politics and the Media’s Influence on Rising Anti-
Chinese Sentiments in Lusaka  
 
 As previously stated, Zambia was one of the earliest African countries in which 
Chinese presence became a robust political issue.235 Michael Sata and his party, the 
Patriotic Front (PF) escalated in profile during Zambia’s 2006 presidential election. Sata 
had a long-standing political career in Zambia after starting as the District Governor of 
Lusaka from 1985 to 1988.236 He developed a reputation as a combative problem-solver, 
unafraid of any opponent; and his 2006 campaign for presidency stayed true to his 
character. Sata’s campaign “reflected on popular urban frustrations in the run-up to the 
election. Such frustrations were dominated by a feeling of neglect, with many Zambians 
believing that they had obtained little benefits from the post-2000 commodities boom and 
blamed the Chinese for worsening labor conditions and political corruption.”237 
Ultimately, Sata exploited wide-spread Zambian dissatisfaction with China’s neo-
colonial presence, while also inflaming them for his political power gain. He became the 
harshest critic of Chinese investment in Zambia, resulting in his party winning “every 
single urban parliamentary seat in the Copperbelt Province where the impacts of 
privatization were most intensely felt.”238 Truth be told, Sata was against all FDI into 
Zambia; however the Chinese were the largest targets of his verbal attacks because their 
deep economic engagement and presence in Zambia cited them as the foreign investor of 
the country. The association with foreign investment and China has to do with Beijing 
investing “heavily in copper mining, which is central to the Zambian economy and 
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identity…[as well as] particularly terrible accidents and publicized instances of worker 
unrest…have taken place in Chinese-owned mines.”239 In Sata’s 2006 campaign “he 
emphasized his opposition to China’s investments because of their negative labor rights 
record, poor conditions of service, lack of adherence to environmental standards, and the 
fact that Chinese investors engaged in petty trade which eliminated the market for 
Zambian small businessmen.” 240 However, he also relied on depicting racist stereotypes 
of Chinese migrants in Africa, playing on the fact that cultural differences and 
xenophobia were easy tools of Zambian citizens to take out their frustrations with the 
Chinese government. He publicly commented on “Chinese people's dirty hygiene and 
eating habits to their alleged plans to conquer the world and even allegations of 
Satanism.”241 The PF appropriated the Zambian employment concerns raised earlier to 
gain votes and further push an aggressive narrative that China was a neo-colonial force in 
Zambia that needed to be stopped as soon as possible. He referred to the Chinese in 
Zambia as “infesters” instead of investors and denounced them for infesting Zambia by 
“bringing in their people to push wheelbarrows instead of hiring local people.” 242243 244 
245 With that being said, promised the large-scale deportation of Chinese nationals 
residing in Zambia, vowing that “’this country [Zambia] belongs to Zambians.’” 246 247 
All in all, Sata ran on the platform that “Zambia [had] become a province of China” and 
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publicly pushed that the only way the problem could be solved was by voting him into 
office.248  
Zambia’s urban centers, including Lusaka, were moved by Sata’s PF presidential 
campaign, as explained by their high Chinese presence. Despite this, Michael Sata lost 
the 2006 presidential election to Levy Mwanawasa of the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD); Sata only received 29.37 percent of the national vote, which was 
counted as 804,748 total votes.249 Nevertheless, the 2006 presidential election “marked a 
high watermark for the expression of democratic opinion in Zambia. A new electoral roll 
significantly increased the number of registered voters to 3,941,229. There was also a 
particularly high turnout of seventy-one percent.”250 Sata found one of the most 
contentious issues in Zambian politics, exploited urban Zambian frustrations of the neo-
colonization of their cities, and “created an unprecedented situation in Zambia: the party 
that lost the electoral battle is winning the political war.”251 Combative rhetoric and 
violent protests of China as an unwanted neo-colonial presence in Zambia soared.   
 The 2006 presidential campaign was not the last of Michael Sata and the PF’s 
anti-Chinese campaign platform. Two years later in 2008, Michael Sata campaigned for 
Zambian presidency after the death of President Mwanawasa. Sata ran on the same 
platform as his 2006 presidency, only in 2008 he took it even further. Sata vowed to 
recognize Taiwan if elected and even referring to the state as a sovereign state. Breaking 
its longstanding and deeply rooted policy of non-interference, the Chinese ambassador to 
Zambia, Li Baodong, responded saying, “’We shall have nothing to do with Zambia if 
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Sata wins the elections and goes ahead to recognize Taiwan,’” a clear exertion of Chinese 
power over Zambia.252  
Sata lost the 2008 election and ran again in 2011, again under the same anti-
Chinese investment platform. By 2011 the anti-Chinese sentiment had soared throughout 
Zambia with increased Chinese investment and economic dependency, and Sata won the 
Zambian presidency.  For the first time in decades, China was unsure of the future of the 
Sino-Zambian relationship.253 It soon became clear, however, that China had nothing to 
worry about. After being sworn in, Sata became disloyal to his supporters, drastically 
going back on his pledge to rid Zambia of its Chinese neo-colonial power. Sata publicly 
declared, “’don’t blame the Chinese, blame yourself because the Chinese are willing to 
work.’” 254 With Sata as president, the Sino-Zambian relationship strengthened despite 
the public’s opposition, as people were negatively impacted by the increase in Chinese 
FDI and expatriate presence. In the end, despite strengthening the Sino-Zambian 
economic dependency relationship, Sata’s exploitation of urban Zambia’s frustrations 
with China profoundly deteriorated the relationship between Chinese investors and 
Zambian workers.255 Overall, by accentuating the exploitative and neo-colonial nature of 
the Sino-Zambian relationship and exacerbating urban Zambian resentments towards 
China, Michael Sata was able to nationalize the issue of China’s presence in Zambia. Sata 
played on nationalism and elevated Zambian residents’ fear and uncertainty about their 
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future into a full-fledged anti-Chinese attitude, in which he was often criticized for 
inciting violent anti-Chinese protests.256  
 Sata’s campaign planted the seeds of Zambian xenophobia against the Chinese, 
and the Zambian media has kept it alive. The position that China represents a neo-
colonial presence in Zambia is shared and developed within the Zambian media. Taking 
into account that many news and media outlets are government-owned, to acquire the 
uncensored opinions of the neo-colonial nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship, this 
chapter analyzes opinion pieces by Zambian writers from multiple Zambian news 
agencies from between 2016 and 2020. Generally, op-eds in Zambian news sources 
directly address the country’s debt distress and economic dependency on China. Zambian 
writers tend to address the lack of debt transparency as the failure of the Zambian 
government. One writer explains, “there is a severe lack of transparency over many key 
questions, including repayment, contracting obligations, project feasibility, value for 
money and loan security. This lack of transparency makes it impossible to have a clear 
account of the implications of this borrowing for the public finances”.257 Zambian Op-ed 
writers make up for the lack of the Chinese and Zambian transparency on the predatory 
debt-distress Zambia is under. One writer clearly explains, “the ambitious infrastructure 
program has contributed to the budget deficit, huge public debt, kwacha depreciation, 
high inflation, high-interest rates, economic corruption and the loss of investor 
confidence.”258 The author gives his reader significantly more transparent information 
than the Zambian government provides its people. Ultimately, by doing so such writers 
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contextualize the experiences of their readers for them, giving formal explanations for the 
dire situations ordinary Zambians have recently found themselves in and did not know 
why because of opaque information from the government. Zambian op-ed writers are 
well aware of their responsibility to properly educate Zambians on the country’s 
economic position. One writer in particular, acknowledges the widespread lack of 
accurate information, beginning their article by saying, “most Zambians do not 
understand the main reason why our economic situation has deteriorated astronomically 
in the last four years and are unable to put a finger on one major cause,” and then goes on 
to contextualize Zambia’s current neo-colonization.259 The writers of these op-eds make a 
point to hold Zambia accountable for lack of transparency and deepening its economic 
dependence on China. Besides protests and op-eds, there are no other ways that Zambians 
speak out against the Zambian government for its culpability in worsening its economic 
situation. Whereas violence against Chinese nationals represents frustrations with the 
Chinese government, it would be nonsensical for Zambians to be violent against other 
Zambians to release frustrations against the Zambian government. This would foster even 
more urban fragmentation in a time when Zambians are working within a nationalist 
framework to expel an outsider (China) from its country.  
Additionally, op-ed writers take an aggressive approach to framing China as a 
neo-colonial power in Zambia; they use contentious, bold, and politically charged 
vocabulary to uphold China as a neo-colonial power. One writer blatantly states that “the 
Zambian debt is like a cancer.”260 Another writer vigorously warns Zambians that “our 
future generations will be economic slaves of the Chinese. The Chinse debt is a full trap, 
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that’s why it’s easy to get. [President] Lungo and [his administration] should realize that 
power is limited but bad decisions can last forever and affect many.”261 Another approach 
that Zambian op-ed writers take to further push the notion of China as a neo-colonial 
power is to promote Chinese projects as anti-Zambian in the way that they assert power 
over the Zambian people in Lusaka. For instance, when the eight Chinese officers were 
appointed to the Lusaka police force, one writer wrote that “Chinese police…in Zambia 
was the initial signs of the Chinese government taking over Zambia.”262 Another writer 
addressed the increased surveillance presence as a result of Chinese road construction in 
their op-ed. They explain that when a Chinese construction company builds a road they 
always include surveillance cameras at intersections, of which the footage is kept and 
controlled by the Chinese government. The author uses the increased surveillance in 
Lusaka to frame Chinese road projects as anti-Zambian. The writer explains, ‘“these spy 
cameras are visible all over Lusaka and billions [have] been spent on this anti-people 
project. Not only is this place barbaric, it’s wasteful and more importantly, it gives the 
security of Zambia in the hands of China. These cameras are controlled by Chinese 
agencies.”263 Ultimately, this writer’s approach frames road construction, a major driver 
in China’s One Belt One Road initiative in Zambia, as a tool of neo-colonialism.  
Comprehensively, these approaches by Zambian writers support their analysis of 
China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia through economic engagement and promote 
China as the enemy of Zambians.  Some writers explain the fact that Zambian animosity 
should go towards the Chinese government. One in particular ends his argument by 
writing, “Please note that, we the people of Zambia [should] love the Chinese people. But 
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we do not want to be ruled by the Chinese government.”264 Unfortunately, more times 
than not this sentiment is lost in translation, and the anger Zambians have for the Chinese 
government is taken out on Chinese residents in Lusaka. With its aggressive rhetoric, the 
media exacerbates the frustrations of Zambian residents, which then become full-fledged 
anti-Chinese attitudes to perpetuate violence both online and in the streets. In one op-ed 
the writer addressed President Lungo’s comment on the Chinese being cockroaches 
therefore the Zambian people should give up on protesting their presence. In response, 
the author disagreed with Lungo and insisted the Zambian people fight on. The comments 
section of the said article was filled with an abundance of comments calling the Chinese 
cockroaches that need to be exterminated. One comment states, “In other words 
[President] Lungu is saying it’s okay for Zambians to live with cockroaches…but my late 
grandmother and father taught me to kill them, If I see one, I step on it, if see many I use 
insect killer, cockroaches are never partners in development.”265 This commenter’s 
aggressive rhetoric is very dangerous. Rhetoric that associates a particular group to 
undesirable creatures and animals has historically been used to perpetuate violence 
against that group. Equating Chinese nationals to cockroaches is dehumanizing and 
suggests that there is violence is brewing with an outbreak on the horizon.  
The consensus seems to be that looting and attacking Chinese nationals and their 
businesses “is a reflection of growing anti-China sentiment in Zambia, much of it fanned 
by a polarized media.  Local tabloids carry headlines such as: "China has controlled our 
economic lifeline." Or "Chinese have deprived us of our jobs and livelihood." Or "They 
 
263 “PF Regime Working with China to Spy on Citizens.” Zambian Watchdog, 16 Jan. 2020. 
264 “Chinese Police Unit in Zambia Was the Initial Signs of Chinese Government Taking Over Zambia.” 
265 “Fighting the Influx of Chinese Is Futile - President Lungu.” Lusaka Times, 13 Dec. 2018. 
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do not respect us. They only want to make money."266 This statement is supported by the 
fact that Zambian media plays an important “role in distorting views of the Chinese, 
because…Zambian journalists ‘emotionally attach themselves to the cause of the 
[Zambian] people’. For the respondents in [a] survey sample, newspapers and television 
ranked second (27.2%) as [Zambians] most important source of information on Chinese 
people and their activities in Zambia, behind personal experience or personal observation 
(46%).”267 Through this media analysis it is clear that the anti-Chinese sentiment in 
Lusaka is aggravated by the Zambian media in op-eds, which results in prejudiced and 
xenophobic attacks. Fear-induced nationalism sparks these anti-Chinese attacks.  
Essentially, Zambians channel their frustrations with the Chinese government into 
violence against Chinese nationals in Lusaka.  
In conclusion, local tensions in Lusaka and other urban Zambian centers have 
become increasingly intense as China’s neo-colonial power over Zambia dramatically 
increases with Zambia’s continuous borrowing and deepening debt distress. These neo-
colonial frustrations have been exacerbated by the Zambian media (through opinion 
pieces) and political parties to a boiling point, in which a general anti-Chinese sentiment 
has emerged. This anti-Chinese sentiment has manifested into bursts of violence, civil 
unrest, and protest. It is important to consider xenophobic anti-Chinese attacks as 
grounded in decades of growing anger and resistance towards China’s neo-colonial 
presence in Zambia, with Chinese nationals acting as scapegoats for Zambians. As 
Zambia continues to unsustainably borrow from China in the wake of widespread 
disapproval from its people, it is inevitable that there will be ever-increasing social 
 
266 Jalloh and Wan.  
267 Van Bracht, 86.  
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fragmentation of Lusaka and other Zambian urban centers. Nevertheless, by exercising 
their right to protest Zambian residents are challenging the narrative that the urban poor is 
powerless. While there has never been an organized anti-Chinese movement in Zambia 
(with the exception of the rise of Michael Sata and the PF) increasing Zambian 
opposition to its government’s choices begs the questions whether or not a massive anti-
Chinese movement will take place across the country, or if the Zambian government will 
eventually listen to its people. In previous instances of national protest, the government 
has renegotiated public policy and tax policy; perhaps under the right amount of pressure, 
it will renegotiate relations with China.268 Nonetheless, it will be much more difficult for 
Zambian officials to restructure China’s neo-colonial FDI because of Zambia’s economic 
dependence. No matter how anti-Chinese investment Zambian officials are, the Sino-
Zambian relationship will put up a fight because of how deeply intertwined Zambia’s 
economy is with China’s. For instance, Michael Sata extensively used anti-Chinese 
rhetoric when campaigning for the presidency. However, once in office he adhered to 
policy that was subservient to China. This implies that breaking away from economic 
integration with China is much more of a challenge than anticipated, reinforcing that 
China is a neo-colonial force in Zambia. This is not to say that Zambia must disengage 
with Chinese FDI; Chinese FDI simply needs to be restructured and funneled into 
poverty mitigation and social services. If not, ordinary Zambians will never see the 
benefits of the Sino-Zambian relationship.  
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Conclusion 
 
China’s long-standing relationship with Zambia laid the groundwork for its neo-
colonization of the country. Zambia’s economic vulnerability to predatory Chinese 
lending practices began when China first established itself as a Global South ally during 
Zambia’s decolonization process in the 1960s and 1970s through the financing of the 
Tanzanian-Zambian heavy rail. The Sino-Zambian relationship was strengthened even 
more in the 1980s and 1990s when Zambia became even more economically vulnerable 
as a result of the damaging SAPs enforced in Zambia by IFIs. Zambia’s economic 
dependency on China intensified in the 2000s when China began strategically employing 
the neo-colonial process of Flexigemony to solidify its place as Zambia’s most prominent 
and leading economic partner. China used Zambia’s desire for development through 
infrastructure as a bargaining chip to fulfill its economic agenda.  
Since One Belt One Road was established by President Xi Jinping in 2013, it has 
become the brand for China’s foreign policy. One Belt One Road has also become the 
primary tool of neo-colonization in Zambia by disguising debt-traps as friendship and 
mutual benefit in order to build economic dependency while building infrastructure in 
Lusaka. Currently, China is the primary neo-colonial presence in Zambia, closely 
followed by Western countries and institutions. Prospects of Zambia achieving economic 
independence anytime soon are grim. Zambia’s decision to prioritize and prefer Chinese 
lending must be recognized as the enforcement of the country’s national sovereignty and 
the Zambian government’s decision-making power. It is imperative to understand this 
exertion of power as Zambia’s responsibility for its continuous declining economic 
status. Holding the Zambian government partially responsible for currently aiding in the 
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process of China’s tightening grip on the country’s economy by no means blames the 
Zambian government for its neo-colonization. Holding the Zambian government 
responsible establishes the government as capable of helping its economy by stopping 
senseless borrowing for white elephant infrastructure projects that do not benefit local 
people and only work to increase Zambia’s debt.269 In light of this, it is important to 
recognize that working with China is the Zambian government’s best effort at making the 
best of its no-win economic status.  
In this thesis, I’ve used the concept of neo-colonialism, an unequal economic 
relationship, in framing the cohesive macro-level engagement between China and 
Zambia. On the micro-level, the Sino-Zambian relationship cultivates urban 
fragmentation in Lusaka due to the lack of improvement to living standards, perceptions 
of Chinese hegemony, the displacement of peri-urban informal communities at the hands 
of Chinese developers building gated communities for Chinese expatiates, resulting in a 
growing anti-Chinese sentiment that blurs the line between patriotism and xenophobia. 
The growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Lusaka is not rooted in racism, but geopolitics. As 
Lusaka residents grow more frustrated with the impacts of the Sino-Zambian relationship, 
they use xenophobia as a tool to scapegoat and villainize Chinese nationals living in 
Zambia. Zambian politicians like Michael Sata in 2006, 2008, and 2011, heightened these 
complex feelings held by Lusaka residents in order to gain political control. At the same 
time, Zambian media, in the form of op-eds and letters to the editors of news outlets, also 
exacerbated and aggravated anti-Chinese sentiments, resulting in violence (i.e. riots, 
protests, and beatings) targeting Chinese expatriates in Lusaka.  
 
269 A white elephant project is an infrastructure project in which the cost of financing and upkeep is more 
than its usefulness or value. Essentially, the maintenance of the project is more expensive than its profits.  
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 Not embracing China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia by arguing that the 
Chinese government is simply an exceptionally strong economic partner to Zambia 
neglects to take into account Zambia’s postcolonial economic history which explains its 
vulnerability and the fundamental imbalance of power that characterizes Sino-Zambian 
relations. It is most important to acknowledge that Zambia has never necessarily been 
economically independent despite gaining national independence from Britain in 1964. 
Even when Zambia was sovereign and considered a middle-income country in the 1970s, 
it still relied on trade with Britain in surrounding colonies. In striving for economic 
independence Zambia would be fighting against neo-colonization, as the two are the 
same. Despite the fact that China was not the original country that colonized Zambia, 
resulting in its economic dependence, it is important that China’s role in cultivating and 
exacerbating economic dependence in Zambia today should not go with impunity. 
Furthermore, recognizing China as a contemporary neo-colonial force in Zambia, but not 
holding Zambia accountable for its agency in fashioning this relationship gives credence 
to the notion of Zambia as a victim. As previously discussed, the perspective of Zambia a 
solely a patsy feeds into the narrative of Africa as the sitting duck of globalization in 
which endless things “happen” to African countries, instead of taking into account the 
internal power of African governments to act and make their own decisions.  
As already indicated, complete economic independence for Zambia in the near 
future is impractical because damage to the country’s economy (its extreme debt and 
heavy reliance on FDI) runs much too deep to repair and bounce back from in the next 
decade. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the Zambian government work towards 
economic independence as efficiently as possible. Seeing that FDI is essential for the 
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Zambian government in terms of carrying out its own national objectives, it would be 
impractical and irresponsible to call for the immediate ending of Chinese FDI in Zambia. 
A break in Chinese FDI would push the Zambian government into more economic 
trouble because it would most likely seek to increase investment from its other neo-
colonial powers. Alternatively, Chinese FDI needs to be used more wisely to foster 
development and enable economic independence for African countries. Chinese FDI can 
facilitate development (and thus economic independence) by channeling a percentage of 
it to entrepreneurial initiatives that work to transition informal work to the formal sector. 
As of 2018, Lusaka had the highest percentage of residents working in the informal 
sector in all of Zambia, at nearly thirty percent.270 Whereas generally employment in the 
informal sector is perceived as better than no employment at all, there is no reason that it 
should not be officially recognized as profitable to the national economy.271  Chinese FDI 
could be channeled into entrepreneurial programs that work to help local Lusaka 
residents establish their businesses as a part of the formal economy, benefiting locals 
through poverty alleviation, and the government through taxes.  
Moreover, the Zambian government can alter the nature of Chinese FDI by 
utilizing its (limited) bargaining power to place regulations on importing unskilled 
Chinese workers and by mandating improved working conditions for Zambian workers. 
Whereas the Zambian government vows development through infrastructure oriented 
FDI, it has failed to “combine growth-promoting policies with policies that allow the 
[urban] poor to participate fully in the opportunities unleased and so contribute to that 
growth. This includes policies to make labor markets work better… and increase 
 
270 Erin Duffin. “Share of Employed Population in Informal Economy in Zambia in 2018, by Province.” 
Statista, 10 Jan. 2020. 
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financial inclusion.”272 As addressed in chapter 3, the anti-Chinese sentiment found 
throughout Lusaka stemmed from feelings of exclusion and abandonment of the Zambian 
government in terms of reaping the on-the-ground benefits of China’s One Belt One 
Road initiative in their own city. By improving employment opportunities, locals will 
finally see improvements in their own lives, slowly chipping away at Lusaka’s inequality 
gap (one of the highest in the world).273  
By all means, channeling a portion of Chinese FDI into entrepreneurial initiatives 
and other poverty alleviation programs, while simultaneously improving employment 
opportunities for local Zambian workers in infrastructure development in Lusaka will not 
guarantee immediate economic success. But, it will foster sustained growth over a longer 
period of time which will eventually help guide Zambia to decreased fiscal susceptibility 
and facilitate eventual economic independence. Only once Zambia is economically 
independent can the Sino-Zambian relationship be considered equal.   
In recent events, the unforeseen Coronavirus, known as COVID-19, has swept 
across the globe, infecting over two million people.  The global pandemic originated in 
Wuhan, China, and has undoubtedly threatened China’s ambitions One Belt One Road 
initiative.274 We are too early on into the global pandemic to see the extent to which 
China’s One Belt One Road partners will be affected both health-wise and economically. 
Many of China’s One Belt One Road partners are reporting low rates of COVID-19, but 
health advisors hypothesize that’s a result of lack of testing.275  
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China’s response to COVOID-19 took expansive measures to isolate the virus and 
essentially shut down cities across the country, but no measures were taken to cease 
construction on One Belt One Road projects.276 Nevertheless, there was no need to. 
Globally, One Belt One Road projects have come to a standstill due to the suspended 
“flow of Chinese labor…with thousands of Chinese workers unable to return to their 
country of work” and disrupted Chinese manufacturing supply chains that One Belt One 
Road projects rely on for materials and supplies.277 COVID-19 has exposed the 
vulnerability of One Belt One Road as misrepresented and reliant on Chinese goods and 
services. Instead of operating like a network (as it is promoted by the Chinese), the 
initiative operates on bi-lateral trade with its supposed partners.278 If One Belt One Road 
projects were locally sourced, construction could have continued, and economic impact 
would have been limited. As for future One Belt One Road projects, Chinese policy 
banks will be less inclined to prioritize FDI over domestic economic reconstruction.279  
Quite early on into the start of the global pandemic, the Chinese government 
recognized the global economic disadvantage that would come with being the epicenter 
of the COVID-19 outbreak. In order to remove itself from the hot seat, the Chinese 
government has begun to present itself as a reliable ally to infected countries. Officials 
work to make sure that “Beijing is remembered not primarily for initial cover-up and 
harsh containment tactics, but as a source of eventual pandemic support.”280 Whereas the 
Chinese government has begun shipping medical supplies to desperate One Belt One 
Road countries, Chinese policy banks have promised to financially support companies in 
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One Belt One Road counties (while maintaining true to their opaque nature by not 
clarifying whether aid would only be given to Chinese companies.)281 As can be seen in 
China’s COVID-19 response and the contemporary and historic Sino-African 
relationship, China has found strategic value in positioning itself as a global friend, while 
other economic powers position themselves as global enforcers.  
In positioning itself as a friend, the Chinese government intends to (yet again) set 
itself apart as a global leader in the wake of COVID-19.282 Similarly to the way in which 
the Chinese government used a global infrastructure gap to create a foreign policy (One 
Belt One Road) and propel China to the center of a global network, it is clear they intend 
to do with same with the health crisis and the global lack of communication. China’s 
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, recently revealed that the government was looking into 
constructing “an international community with a shared future’ that will tackle the current 
outbreak and future pandemics by implementing an avenue for spreading information, 
best practices, technology, and know-how.”283 Predictions project that if this new global 
health initiative comes to fruition, it could eclipse the World Health Organization 
inefficiency, essentially placing China at the center of the global health conversation.284 
Despite positioning itself as a global pandemic ally, the Chinese government’s 
domestic response to COVID-19 places an incredible strain on the Sino-African 
relationship by prioritizing radical race-based containment measures over the rights and 
well-being of African nationals in China. After five Nigerians tested positive for COVID-
19 in early April, the Chinese government blamed Africans in China for the spread of the 
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disease.285 In response, Chinese officials have imposed a very strict surveillance and 
testing program, followed by a fourteen-day mandatory quarantine of all African 
nationals in China, regardless of testing positive for the disease or travel history.286 This 
restrictive policy has sprouted xenophobic roots and developed into the out-right 
mistreatment of African nationals.  
 The ill-treatment of African nationals in response to COVID-19 is most obvious 
in Guangzhou, one of China’s largest destinations for African traders and businessmen, 
and the largest population of African nationals in China.287 In Guangzhou, African 
nationals are singled out for their race, evicted from their apartments in the middle of the 
night, forced into quarantine, and in some cases even refused entry to apartment buildings 
and local businesses because of bans on black people.288 Clearly, containment efforts of 
the disease have taken a dark turn in a racist manner, which has “snowballed into an 
embarrassing and awkward diplomatic race scandal for Beijing.”289 Social media brought 
international attention to the mistreatment of African nationals in China after photos and 
videos of African families being violently evicted, forced to sleep outside and under 
bridges during the global pandemic, and being denied entry to apartment buildings and 
service in businesses surfaced online.290  
African officials that “normally do not rock the boat about matters related to 
China - especially at a time when African countries are looking to China for debt relief as 
COVID-19 debilitates economies around the world” have expressed that the treatment of 
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African nationals by the Chinese government is a betrayal of South-South solidarity.291 
They have reached out to Chinese officials both informally (through social media) and 
formally, to protest as an expression of their anger and concern.292 Chinese officials have 
defended their merciless policy against African nationals and their refusal to hold 
Chinese landlords and business owners accountable for Anti-African sentiments by 
insisting it is a misunderstanding. Zhao Lijian, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, 
has asserted that all foreigners are being treated equally in China’s domestic response to 
COVID-19.293 What Lijian does not take into consideration is that “not all foreigners 
come from an equal footing.” 294 African nationals in China are more vulnerable to 
China’s mandatory quarantine policy because they often come from lesser developed 
countries with lower socioeconomic status. The mandatory quarantine policy charges an 
average of US $40 to $50 per day, billed directly to the patient. Given how the disease 
has essentially placed the formal and informal economy at a stand-still, some African 
nationals are having immense difficulty paying their quarantine bill.295 Chinese officials 
claim to have a strategy to reduce financially burdensome medical costs, but yet again, 
true to its opaque nature, has not clarified how this relief program will be put into 
practice.296 
The public political conflict between African and Chinese officials is 
unprecedented in the Sino-African relationship. Never before have “the two sides had 
such a critical, high-profile, and widespread clash of positions, let alone allowed it to 
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erupt in front of the public.” 297 This public clash raises the concern that even if the Sino-
African relationship is politically mended, social fragmentation between the two societies 
will be irreparable after the damage caused by Chinese society’s domestic treatment of 
African nationals following COVID-19. Much like the uncertain future of Sino-African 
relations, it is unclear whether or not African nationals will be socially accepted back into 
their Chinese communities, as well as what kind of long term negative social 
consequences they will face for being associated with the disease.  
Returning to Zambia, as of April 27, 2020, there are eighty-eight recorded cases 
of COVID-19 and three deaths; Zambia is currently ranked thirty-second in Africa in 
numbers of cases.298 It’s been reported that the government has not yet put a stimulus 
package in place, but it would be in their best interest to do so as quickly as possible.299 
The Zambian government should take advantage of China’s dial back in One Belt One 
Road projects in the wake of COVID-19 to gain the trust and support of Zambians. 
Seizing China’s economic pullback as an opportunity would allow for the Zambian 
government to distance itself from China. If the COVID-19 crisis has cracked the 
window for Zambia to distance itself from China, it is up to the ambition and will of the 
Zambian government to blow it wide-open and take measures to finally gain economic 
independence.   
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